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ABSTRACT
Gupta, Aditi Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Secure Platforms for En-
forcing Contextual Access Control. Major Professor: Elisa Bertino.
Advances in technology and wide scale deployment of networking enabled portable
devices such as smartphones has made it possible to provide pervasive access to sensi-
tive data to authorized individuals from any location. While this has certainly made
data more accessible, it has also increased the risk of data theft as the data may be
accessed from potentially unsafe locations in the presence of untrusted parties. The
smartphones come with various embedded sensors that can provide rich contextual
information such as sensing the presence of other users in a context. Frequent con-
text profiling can also allow a mobile device to learn its surroundings and infer the
familiarity and safety of a context. This can be used to further strengthen the access
control policies enforced on a mobile device. Incorporating contextual factors into
access control decisions requires that one must be able to trust the information pro-
vided by these context sensors. This requires that the underlying operating system
and hardware be well protected against attacks from malicious adversaries.
In this work, we explore how contextual factors can be leveraged to infer the safety
of a context. We use a context profiling technique to gradually learn a context’s pro-
file, infer its familiarity and safety and then use this information in the enforcement of
contextual access policies. While intuitive security configurations may be suitable for
non-critical applications, other security-critical applications require a more rigorous
definition and enforcement of contextual policies. We thus propose a formal model
for proximity that allows one to define whether two users are in proximity in a given
context and then extend the traditional RBAC model by incorporating these prox-
imity constraints. Trusted enforcement of contextual access control requires that the
xunderlying platform be secured against various attacks such as code reuse attacks. To
mitigate these attacks, we propose a binary diversification approach that randomizes
the target executable with every run. We also propose a defense framework based on
control flow analysis that detects, diagnoses and responds to code reuse attacks in
real time.
11 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are fast becoming an integral part
of life for many users. They are used for performing everyday tasks like Email and
Internet banking that involves storing sensitive data on the device. They also contain
personal data like photos and videos, communication logs, location information and
logs of monetary transactions. Earlier mobiles devices were simple feature phones with
basic functionality of making phone calls. Now these devices have gradually evolved
into powerful computational devices with embedded sensors and network connectivity.
Users can now access and process data from anywhere using their smartphones or
tablets. However, pervasive access to data implies that a user can also access data
from potentially unsafe contexts. This can lead to leakage of sensitive information.
For instance, an employee can access his corporate email from his mobile device while
sitting in a cafe. A malicious adversary or even a curious bystander may gain access
to confidential corporate information by shoulder-surfing attack. Further, if the user’s
device is connected to an untrusted or unsecured access point such as free WiFi at
the cafe, then a malicious adversary can steal user’s information such as login and
passwords by eavesdropping on the unencrypted tra c. Thus, access control policies
that assume static unchanging context are not su cient for mobile devices and must
incorporate contextual factors while evaluating access request.
Contextual access control incorporates various contextual factors such as location
of the user while specifying and enforcing access policies. For example, a policy based
on location may allow a doctor to access patients’ medical records only when he or
she is physically present at the hospital. Here, the location of the user determines the
context of the user. However, the notion of context is quite vague and application
dependent. In the realm of context-aware computing, Dey [1] defines context as “any
information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is
2a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user
and an application, including the user and applications themselves.” A context may
comprise of one or more context variables such as location of the user, other users
in proximity, time of the day, temperature, noise levels etc. Di↵erent applications
may consider a di↵erent set of contextual factors to identify a context. For example,
applications such as friend finder and deal finder consider only the location of a user as
a contextual factor while other applications such as mobile apps for public transport
schedule may consider both location and time.
Presence of other users in proximity is another contextual factor that can a↵ect
the safety of a context for access control applications. For example, in a military
setting, it may be unsafe to access a top secret document in the presence of any
civilian. Another example, would be when presence of other users, say a supervisor,
makes the context safe for certain actions. For instance, a nurse may be allowed to
access a patient’s medical data only in the presence of a doctor. That is, proximity
based access control can be considered as an instance of contextual access control
where access policies allow or deny access requests based on the presence of other
users in proximity. Specifying access policies in such settings requires a precise and
formal definition of proximity. Absence of a formal model for proximity can lead to
ambiguous interpretations while enforcing access control.
A user’s context is inherently dynamic in nature due to the constantly changing
context variables and this may a↵ect the safety of the context. If sensitive data is
accessed from an unsafe context, then the security of this data may be compromised.
This calls for strong protection mechanisms on mobile devices. Protection mecha-
nisms serve their purpose only when they are configured with sensible policies for
accessing and sharing data. However, managing a large number of policy configura-
tions can be quite overwhelming and unintuitive for a user. Application and service
designers attempt to tackle the usability problem by providing users with a default
policy configuration. But a global default policy may not be suitable for the needs
of every user. Users are therefore left with two unsatisfactory alternatives: either use
3one-size-fits-all default policies which may not be sensible, or, su↵er through manually
configuring the bulk of policies by hand which may not be intuitive or easy-to-use.
Modern smartphones are equipped with a variety of sensors capable of continu-
ously monitoring a wide range of parameters such as location, Bluetooth and WiFi
devices in the neighborhood, temperature, ambient light, noise levels etc. These ob-
servations characterize the context of a device, and hence of its user. We argue that
by profiling contexts in terms of how the context parameters change over time, we can
infer appropriate access and sharing policies for sensitive data on the device, which
can help towards at least partially automating the process of setting sensible policies.
Even if the access request is made from a safe context, no guarantees on correct
enforcement can be provided if the device itself has been compromised. This risk is
elevated by the bring you own device (BYOD) trend where corporate organizations
allow employees to bring their personal devices to work and connect it to the corpo-
rate network. This puts the security of corporate network at a risk since a malware
infected device can infect other devices on the network and steal confidential informa-
tion. Correct enforcement of contextual access control requires that the information
received from contextual sensors is correct and the system has not been compromised.
A malicious adversary may compromise the system by exploiting some vulnerability
such as bu↵er overflow and then hijacking the control flow. Return oriented program-
ing (ROP) attack is one such attack that can execute arbitrary logic by reusing the
‘good’ code in the victim system towards malicious purposes. It is necessary to build
tools and techniques that that will protect systems against these kinds of attacks.
This work examines the feasibility of developing secure platforms for enforcing con-
textual access control. In particular, it discusses solutions to three problems. First,
how can a mobile device automatically infer the safety of a context and intuitively
configure access policies. Second, how to formally define proximity and incorporate
proximity constraints in contextual access control. Third, how to secure the un-
derlying platform against code-reuse attacks so that access control can be correctly
enforced. These are discussed in more details below.
41.1 Intuitive Security Policy Configuration
Configuring access control policies in mobile devices can be quite tedious and
unintuitive for users. Software designers attempt to address this problem by setting
up default policy configurations. But such global defaults may not be sensible for all
users. We conjecture that profiling a variety of contextual information can be used
to infer the familiarity and safety of a context and aid in access control decisions.
As an illustrative example, consider the case of device locks : Mobile devices have a
device lock feature similar to the screen-saver lock on PCs. When the device has been
idle for a pre-defined fixed period of time, the device lock kicks in. Thereafter the user
has to unlock the device before accessing the applications and data on the device. A
device may support multiple unlocking methods like a slider or passcode entry but a
specific unlocking method has to be chosen when the device lock feature is enabled.
In an enterprise, the enterprise system administrator may force its users to use strong
device lock if the device is capable of accessing enterprise data like corporate e-mail
or intranet websites. Suppose a user, Alice, finds it very inconvenient having to type
in a passcode several times every day. She may decide to disable the device lock
and risk the compromise of her sensitive data like e-mails, or she may opt to remove
applications like corporate e-mail that mandate the use of device lock.
Alice’s experience with device lock can be significantly improved by making the
device lock to adapt its behavior based on the context. Instead of having a fixed pre-
defined timeout for the device lock to kick-in and always using the same unlocking
method, the device lock application could use dynamic configuration of these param-
eters depending on the device context. For example, in a safe and familiar place like
her home where the likelihood of the device being stolen is low, Alice would like to
have a long timeout, and a “shallow” unlocking method like a slider (that does not
tax her too much), whereas in an unfamiliar place she would be willing to live with
a very short timeout and a “deeper” unlocking method like passcode entry.
5The question then is “how can the device estimate the familiarity and safety for
a context at any given time?” We propose a framework to estimate the familiarity
and safety of a context at any instant and use these values to dynamically configure
security policies. In this approach, the device periodically scans its environment for
a variety of context variables like GPS readings, WiFi access points and Bluetooth
devices. Based on these scans, the device discovers contexts that are encountered
repeatedly; these are likely personal contexts of interest (CoIs) for the user. The
device then profiles these CoIs by keeping track of which WiFi and Bluetooth devices
are encountered in a given CoI and the nature of those encounters. These profiles can
be used to estimate the familiarity of a device with respect to a context. The inferred
device familiarity values can then be used to estimate the familiarity of a context
itself. The device then uses current and historically aggregated context familiarity
information to estimate the safety of the current context.
This basic approach needs to be complemented by allowing the user to provide
feedback about the perceived safety of a context. Feedback is important in two
respects: either the user wants to speed up the learning process or wants to correct
incorrectly inferred estimated safety of a context.
User privacy is an explicit design principle for our framework. We do not want
either the raw sensor data or the inferred contextual parameters to leave the user’s
device. Therefore, all of the contextual data is stored and processed locally on the
user’s device itself which enables better security and privacy protection.
Intuitive policy configuration may not be suitable for applications that require
strong security guarantees. For example, security applications in military setting may
require explicit policy configuration and precise definition of the context variables of
interest. In the next subsection, we discuss formal model for one such context variable,
that is proximity.
61.2 Formal Proximity Model for Access Control
To combat the threat of information leakage through pervasive access, researchers
have proposed several extensions to the popular role-based access control (RBAC)
model. Such extensions can incorporate contextual features, such as location, into
the policy decision in an attempt to restrict access to trustworthy settings. In many
cases, though, such extensions fail to reflect the true threat, which is the presence
or absence of other users, rather than absolute locations. For instance, for location-
aware separation of duty, it is more important to ensure that two people are in the
same room, rather than in a designated, pre-defined location.
Prox-RBAC [2] was proposed as an extension to consider the relative proximity
of other users with the help of a pervasive monitoring infrastructure. However, we
have identified two shortcomings with Prox-RBAC as previously proposed. First,
the model relies on an intuitive notion that “proximity” means the users are present
(or not) within the same physical space. This lack of a rigorous understanding of
proximity can lead to surprising interpretations. For instance, in Prox-RBAC, two
users at opposite ends of a building could be considered to be within proximity for
one policy; however, for another policy, two users standing in adjacent rooms on
opposite sides of the same door would not be in proximity of one another. As such,
this informal approach allows for entities to be in proximity, despite the fact that
they are not physically close.
Second, we find the exclusive focus on the spatial domain to be unnecessarily
restrictive. The intuition that proximity indicates relative closeness of two entities
can be applied in several domains with interesting results. For instance, a temporal
proximity constraint could require that two people digitally sign a document within
24 hours. In attribute-based proximity, an Assistant Professor and an Associate
Professor have professions (i.e., attributes) that are similar. Clearly, a unified and
formal definition of proximity can be applied to a wide variety of settings.
7We have analyzed five contextual domains, or realms, namely geographic, attribute-
based, social, cyber, and temporal realms for defining proximity. In this work, we
define these realms and show how they can be mapped onto a unified abstract space
model. We then apply the calculus-based method [3] for defining topological relations
on features in order to specify a formal distance metric. We use this metric to define
two forms of proximity, specifically weak role proximity and strong role proximity. In
both forms, proximity specifies that two entities must have a distance measure (in
the abstract space) that is less than some threshold value.
It is important to emphasize the advantages of this formal approach. First, by
grounding the notion of proximity in terms of a distance and threshold values, we
ensure that our formalisms reflect the intuition of proximity as closeness. As such, the
mandatory specification of a metric reduces the likelihood of surprising interpretations
of proximity. Second, by defining proximity in terms of an abstract space model, our
approach is very flexible and simplifies the adaptation of policies for other realms
beyond the five we consider. That is, mapping the realms onto the abstract space
model allows us to define a common framework for enforcing the policy constraints;
adapting the model and policies for additional realms would only require mapping
the realm onto the abstract space model. Finally, by defining a common enforcement
architecture, it is possible to develop reusable code libraries and protocols that could
be applied to any enforcement architecture that maps onto our abstract space model.
1.3 Securing Systems against Code Reuse Attacks
Correct enforcement of contextual access control requires that the underlying plat-
forms are secure and able to defend against attacks from malicious adversaries. As
a first step, we explore the defense techniques for conventional systems such as PCs.
These techniques can then be applied to other non conventional systems such as
mobile devices and other embedded systems. In particular, we focus on code-reuse
attacks, including return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented program-
8ming (JOP), that bypass defenses against code injection by repurposing existing ex-
ecutable code toward a malicious end.
A common feature of these attacks is the reliance on the knowledge of the layout
of the executable code. Early solutions to the problem of code-reuse based exploits fo-
cused on the introduction of randomness into the memory image of a process. Specif-
ically, by randomizing the start address of the code segment, a single exploit packet
would not be e↵ective on all running instances of an application. Although random-
ization initially seemed promising, these solutions su↵ered from the small amount of
randomization possible [4]. Consequently, successful brute-force attacks were feasible.
We propose to re-examine the granularity at which randomization is performed as a
defense against ROP attacks.
Our system, Marlin, introduces a randomization technique that shu✏es the code
blocks in an application binary. This technique is integrated into a customized bash
shell that randomizes the target binary at load time just before execution. This ran-
domization approach has many benefits. First, for any decent-sized code base with a
large number of blocks, the number of possible randomization makes brute-force ap-
proaches infeasible. Second, this approach can be applied to any ELF binary without
requiring the source code of an application. Third, the randomization is performed
at load time which means that potentially every execution of the binary results in a
di↵erent address layout. Finally, our scheme o↵ers an alternative to approaches that
dynamically monitor critical data like return addresses. Although these schemes are
e↵ective, they distribute the performance cost throughout the execution life-time of
the process. In our solution, the entire performance cost is paid once during process
setup, and is quite reasonable; after the execution begins, the code runs as originally
designed.
Attack detection or prevention techniques by themselves are not su cient as it
is not clear what action must be taken once an attack is detected and also how to
prevent this attack from happening again. Attack diagnosis is crucial as it not only
provides input for the attack response, but also indicates which preventive measures
9need to be applied, such as fine grained code randomization. Also, diagnosis informa-
tion provides deeper insights into the type and complexity of an attack which reflects
on the technical expertise of the attackers. This information, thus, allows organi-
zations to strengthen their defenses by selectively applying preventive measures not
just to the target process but also to other applications that respond to tra c from
similar domains. Once an attack is detected and diagnosed, appropriate response ac-
tions must be deployed. Towards this goal, we propose ROPShield, a comprehensive
detection, diagnosis and response framework for defense against ROP attacks.
The detection component in ROPShield employs a run-time monitoring mecha-
nism to detect and respond to ROP attacks in real time. These attacks alter the
control flow of the target process and violate certain execution constraints. Our ap-
proach detects these attacks by evaluating these constraints at various points during
a program’s execution. For instance, by observing the behavior of an ROP attack, we
can see that the control flow of the exploit code is di↵erent from that of an ordinary
program. In a normal program, the instructions of a function execute from within its
own frame on the stack. However, in a ROP execution, the instructions executed due
to the attack may jump to the middle of another function and execute from another
function’s stack frame. Our technique leverages such observations to identify an ille-
gal execution flow. Since we check for only certain execution invariants, our approach
does not require a complete control flow graph of the target process.
Once an attack is detected, ROPShield performs attack diagnosis to identify the
type and cause of this attack. The type of attack is identified based on the execu-
tion constraints that are violated. Further, the process state at the time of attack
along with debugging information is used to identify the precise cause of the attack.
ROPShield generates a diagnosis report containing information about the attack and
the process state at the time of attack. The collection of such fine grained diagnosis
information is possible because of tracing based detection technique that allows us
to continuously examine the process’ execution state. An accurate diagnosis also al-
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lows us to deploy better responses such as identifying and patching a bu↵er overflow
vulnerability.
We propose two types of response mechanisms, both of which must be deployed
to e↵ectively secure any system. The first type of response is the immediate response
that must be deployed as soon as the attack is detected to prevent further damage.
Examples of such response include terminating the process, shutting down the system
or blocking the IP address that was the source of this attack. While this type of
response o↵ers immediate protection, it does not solve the problem in the long run
as the attacker might be able to replay the original or slightly tweaked version of the
attack as soon as the system is live again.
The second type of response, long-term response, is aimed at preventing such
attacks from occurring in the future. The critical component of this response is to
identify the software vulnerability that led to the injection of ROP exploit payload and
patch this vulnerability. In current systems, this is usually done manually by security
administrators, or other specialized sta↵, that analyze the system logs to identify the
cause of the attack and the vulnerable bu↵er that led to the bu↵er overflow. This
is clearly a time consuming and error prone approach. It is desirable to automate
this type of response where the vulnerability is automatically identified and patched
without significant e↵ort from the security administrators. In this respect, our tool
leverages the diagnosis report generated during attack diagnosis phase to identify and
patch the vulnerability. Our technique uses a combination of tools and techniques
(as discussed in section 6.3) to identify the vulnerable bu↵er, fix the source code,
and then restart the application. The advantage of ROPShield is that it provides an
end-to-end defense by using fine grained diagnosis to seamlessly integrate appropriate
response techniques without requiring significant e↵ort from system administrator.
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1.4 Document Structure
The rest of this document discusses the above topics in further detail. In the
next chapter, we survey the state of the art and present the background information
necessary to understand this work. In chapter 3, we discuss our profiling framework
that automatically infers the familiarity and safety of a context and configures security
policies accordingly. In chapter 4, we present a formal proximity model for RBAC
systems and discuss proximity in five di↵erent realms - geographical, attribute-based,
cyber, social and temporal proximity. Next, we present a fine grained randomization
technique to defend against code reuse attacks in chapter 5. In chapter 6, we present a
defense framework against ROP attacks that integrates the components for detection,
diagnosis and response against these attacks. In chapter 7, we summarize the work
done in this dissertation.
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2 STATE OF THE ART
This chapter presents a survey of state of the art research work relevant to the topics
discussed in this document. We categorize this related work into three categories as
discussed below.
2.1 Context Profiling and Automatic Policy Configuration
Location, WiFi and Bluetooth traces provide rich context information and have
been utilized for several contextual applications. The Jyotish framework [5] utilizes
the joint WiFi and Bluetooth traces for predicting the movement of users. It clusters
the WiFi access point information to detect locations and uses Bluetooth traces to
predict the most likely future contacts. Our work uses WiFi and Bluetooth traces to
estimate context familiarity and safety.
Zhou et al. [6] and Nurmi et al. [7] use the location traces along with other
information to identify meaningful places like home and work for their user. These
meaningful places have several applications in location based services. We also exploit
similar facts to identify points of interest and build up a context familiarity profile
for these places.
The Familiar Stranger project [8] studies the properties and phenomenon of Famil-
iar Stranger relationships. A familiar stranger is a stranger that the user repeatedly
encounters but never interacts with. It uses a notion of device familiarity that is
derived from the number of encounters with the stranger’s device. The degree of
familiarity is used to visualize the number of familiar strangers present at a specific
place to the user. Unlike this work, we tie the notion of device familiarity to a given
place and use it to estimate the familiarity and safety of a context.
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Greenstadt and Beal [9] propose that mobile devices can utilize cues from user
behavior to identify the users and make security decisions on their behalf. Jakobsson
et al. [10] emphasize on the need for authentication techniques on mobile device with
no or very limited user involvement. They utilize cues from user behavior like phone
activity, mobility etc. to implicitly authenticate the user to the device and to provide
addition assurance in sensitive transactions. Our primary focus is not on the method
for user authentication, but on how to select one out of many authentication methods
(with varying usability and strength) based on the safety of current context.
In [11], Danezis discusses how various social contexts can be automatically inferred
for users from the social graphs around them. Privacy settings for these social contexts
can be extracted based on the policy that content generated in a social context should
be accessible only in that context. We focus on using device’s context to configure
access policies.
Conti et al. [12] propose a framework, CRePe, for enforcing context-related policies
for smartphones that requires manual configuration of policies. Our system profiles
the user’s context to estimate its familiarity and automatically infer policies. Our
system can be integrated with the CRePE framework to allow a user to specify policies
based on context familiarity as a logical sensor in addition to other sensor values.
Kelley et al. [13] introduce the notion of user-controllable policy learning where
the user and system refine a common policy model in an incremental manner. Their
system benefits from user feedback to gradually learn and identify policy improve-
ments. Our model also incorporates user feedback to improve the decision making
process.
Edwards et al. [14] highlight the pitfalls of automating access control where the
control over security decisions is removed from the user’s hands and given to the
system. In our approach, we do not take away the control from a user. Instead, we
assist the user by suggesting policy decisions and also incorporating user feedback.
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2.2 Contextual Access Control Models
Role based access control (RBAC) [15] is a permission model that grants access
based on roles that users have as a part of an organization. Several extensions to
RBAC have been proposed that attempt to incorporate various contextual factors
while making access decisions. In this section we will present an overview of these
contextual access control models.
GEO-RBAC [16] and LRBAC [17] are contextual access control models that in-
corporate location of the user requesting access as a factor in deciding access control.
Gal et al. [18] consider temporal attributes such as time of access as a factor in deci-
sion making. STARBAC [19], Lot RBAC [20] and Atluri et al. [21] incorporate both
location of the user and time of access into the access control model. While these
consider some specific contextual factors, [22–24] take a more general approach by
designing access control framework that can incorporate a variety of contextual fac-
tors. Our work incorporates the proximity to other users in various realms as a factor
in access control decisions. SRBAC [25] and Kirkpatrick et al. [26] consider spatial
and temporal constraints for mobile RBAC systems while our approach is applicable
to a more general domain.
Prox-RBAC [2] extended the notion of spatially aware RBAC to consider the
relative locations of other users within an indoor space model [27,28], and is the closest
paper to the current work. However, Prox-RBAC relied on an intuitive, informal
notion of proximity that allowed for surprising and contradictory interpretations of
proximity; furthermore, Prox-RBAC focused exclusively on the geographic realm,
whereas our own work is applicable to a wider range of contextual factors.
While Prox-RBAC is unique in combining proximity constraints with RBAC, it is
not the first work to consider contextual similarity between users when requests are
evaluated. TMAC [29] incorporates contextual information into team-based access
control by actively monitoring ongoing interactions. PBAC [30, 31] models focus on
e ciently granting authorizing emergency service providers in time-critical settings.
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However, all of these works restrict proximity definition to only the geographic realm,
unlike our own.
2.3 Defenses against Code Reuse Attacks
We now discuss various defense techniques that have been proposed to counter
code reuse attacks such as ROP attacks. Some defense techniques focus on detecting
and/or preventing stack overflows. By preventing a successful bu↵er overflow, these
defenses prevent the code reuse attacks to progress. Examples of such techniques in-
clude StackGuard [32], StackShield [33] and SmashGuard [34]. LibSafe [35] prevents
exploitation of vulnerable functions for bu↵er overflow by intercepting calls to these
functions and redirecting them to their substitute versions. This has limited applica-
bility since it does not prevent attacks that leverage vulnerable functions which are
not protected using LibSafe.
Address obfuscation [36] and address-space layout randomization (ASLR) (e.g.,
PaX [37]) are two well-known techniques for defending against code-reuse attacks.
Address obfuscation and ASLR on 32-bit architectures have the same short-comings
of Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) in that the small amount of randomization
leaves application vulnerable to attacks [4,38]. That is, Shacham et al. demonstrated
that existing randomization techniques can be defeated by brute-force. Also, infor-
mation leakage can allow an attacker to learn the randomized base address of libc [39].
Consequently, simply randomizing the base address does not e↵ectively block the at-
tack. [36] suggests randomizing function blocks as one of the address obfuscation
techniques; however this particular technique was neither implemented nor discussed
in detail.
In chapter 5, we propose Marlin defense technique that uses fine-grained random-
ization to break the ROP attack assumption of predictable address layout. Some
recent research works have also explored the idea of software diversification as a de-
fense against ROP attacks. ILR [40] randomizes location of every instruction in the
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application code and and guides the execution using a fall through map. ILR relies
on a process-level virtual machine that incurs a performance cost throughout the
duration of the application. In contrast, Marlin’s performance impact is primarily
limited to the start-up cost. Pappas et al. [41] propose an in-place code random-
ization technique that probabilistically breaks 80% of the instruction sequences that
are useful for attacks. However, Marlin provides stronger guarantees by shu✏ing the
entire memory image, thus probabilistically breaking all instruction sequences. Also,
Marlin randomizes the executable with every run unlike [40] and [41] that do not
re-diversify the binary. XIFER [42] and STIR [43] apply software diversification to
an application at runtime to protect against code-reuse attacks. While [41–43] apply
diversification at the granularity of basic blocks, we randomize at function block level
and show that this is su cient to make brute force attacks infeasible. Also, these
techniques would incur more overhead than Marlin as they randomize at a very fine
granularity. Marlin is a novel solution for thwarting ROP attacks and does not have
the limitations discussed above.
Another work that uses similar methodology as Marlin is ASLP [44]. However,
this work substantially di↵ers from our work in intent, requirements and low-level
techniques. ASLP requires user input, while Marlin works without user input. ASLP
requires relocation information, without which the program has to be recompiled and
relinked. It involves rewriting ELF header, program header and section headers and
shu✏ing around sections in addition to functions and variables. We randomize only
the function blocks within the code segment and show that it introduces su cient
entropy to thwart ROP attacks. Thus, our approach incurs less overhead than ASLP.
Bhatkar et al. [45] also propose a randomization approach to protect against memory
error exploits. However, the technique used by them di↵ers from Marlin since they
associate a function pointer with every function and transform every function call into
an indirect function using this function pointer while we perform binary rewriting.
Also, unlike Marlin, function reordering in [45] is not done at load time.
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Marlin can be seen as a variation on the idea of proactive obfuscation [46]. This
approach uses an obfuscating program that applies a semantics-preserving transfor-
mation to the protected server application. That is, the executable image di↵ers each
time the obfuscator runs, but the end result of the computation is identical. The
proactive aspect means that the server is regularly taken o↵-line and replaced with
a new obfuscated version, thus limiting the time during which a single exploit will
work. However, Marlin has more general applicability than to replicas in distributed
services. Some techniques such as [47, 48] reorder functions for performance opti-
mization at linking stage. Since the output of these approaches is just one optimized
binary, they do not diversify the binary and hence do not o↵er any strong protection
against ROP attacks.
DynIMA [49] combines the memory measurement capabilities of a TPM with
dynamic taint analysis to monitor the integrity of the process in execution. Other
approaches store sensitive data, such as return addresses, on a shadow stack and
validate their integrity before use [50, 51]. ROPecker [52] detects ROP attack at
runtime by checking the presence of long chain of gadgets in the past and future
execution flow. The disadvantage of these approaches is that there is a non-zero
performance cost for every checked instruction. Also, with the exception of [51],
these schemes assume gadgets end in ret instructions, and do not consider the more
general case where gadgets may end in jump instructions.
Compiler-based solutions [53, 54] that create code without ret instructions have
also been proposed. G-Free [53] is a compiler based approach that eliminates free-
branch instructions and prevents mid-instruction jumps. However, these techniques
have the obvious disadvantage that they fail to prevent attacks based on jmp in-
structions. Compiler techniques have also been proposed to generate diversity within
community of deployed code [55]. That is, instead of all users executing the same
compiled image (i.e., a monoculture), when a user downloads an application from an
“app store” model, the compiler generates a unique executable, which would stop a
single attack from succeeding on all users. While we find this approach very promis-
18
ing, it is not universally applicable, and would not stop an attacker with a singular
target. Further, it would require access to application’s source code that is not typi-
cally available.
Control flow integrity (CFI) [56] based defenses ensure that the program execu-
tion conforms to the pre-determined control flow graph (CFG) [56–58]. Instead of
checking for control violation before an instruction execution, control flow locking [58]
performs lazy checks for control flow violation after a control transfer has occurred.
[57] performs dynamic integrity checking by using binary instrumentation to detect
code reuse attacks. Total-CFI [59] detects control flow exploits by enforcing system
wide control flow integrity. CFI based approaches generally require complete CFG
information which is not always available. We have proposed a runtime detection
technique, ROPShield, that does not have this limitation. CCFIR [60] is a recently
proposed protection against control hijacking that limits indirect control transfers
to pre-collected legal targets. However, return to libc attacks are still possible on
CCFIR-protected binaries if the target function (example, system()) is a part of the
legal target. Our approach ROPShield does not require CFG information as it checks
for execution invariants that are independent of specific program behavior. Also, our
technique is based on tracing and does not perform binary instrumentation or source
transformation.
Dynamic detection techniques based on binary instrumentation have also been
proposed [50, 61]. DROP [61] is a binary monitor implemented as an extension to
Valgrind [62]. DROP detects ret instructions and initiates a dynamic evaluation
routine based on a statistical analysis of normal program behavior. When a ret
instruction would end in an address in libc, DROP determines if the current execution
routine exceeds a candidate gadget length threshold. These thresholds are based on a
static analysis of normal program behavior. The binary to be run must be compiled
with DROP enabled.
It is important to notice that all the above approaches only deal with detection
and/or prevention of control hijacking attacks. They do not provide any diagnosis
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information or response framework. Our system, ROPShield, integrates detection, di-
agnosis and response components into a single framework, thus providing a complete
defense approach. Some other existing approaches also provide diagnosis informa-
tion. PointerScope [63] captures the key attack steps by identifying pointer misuse.
Misuse is detected as type conflicts when other types of data are used as control
pointers. However, this work does not integrate any response mechanism to show
how the attack steps that were identified can be used in deploying appropriate re-
sponse. DIRA [64], implemented as a GCC compiler extension, transforms the target
program’s source code so that it can detect a control hijacking attack, repair the mem-
ory damage and identify the attack packets. The only response mechanism deployed
by DIRA is memory repair, while ROPShield framework integrates multiple response
mechanisms. Other patching techniques [65–67] have been proposed as well that au-
tomatically identify and/or patch vulnerable bu↵ers responsible for bu↵er overflow.
Another work with similar goal to ours is SafeStack [68]. SafeStack uses memory ac-
cess virtualization technique which relocates vulnerable bu↵er to a protected memory
region. Once this patch is applied, the application survives future attacks on this
vulnerable bu↵er. Unlike ROPShield, this approach does not diagnose the type of
attack (such as ROP) and proposes a single response action, that is patching the vul-
nerability. Our approach integrates additional response mechanisms such as enabling
code randomization and these response actions are configurable. ROPShield shares
some similar goals with DIRA and SafeStack but adopts a di↵erent methodology.
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3 INTUITIVE SECURITY POLICY CONFIGURATION
Configuring security and privacy policies in mobile devices can pose major usability
challenges for the end user. Often, the di culty in understanding the configuration
options and choosing the correct settings for access control mechanisms discourages
users from using those mechanisms in the first place. In this chapter, we describe
the design of a context profiling framework to intuitively infer sensible access poli-
cies without user intervention, while still allowing corrective user feedback. We use
the device lock scenario as an example of applying our context profiler. However,
context-profiling based approach is not limited to device-locking and has several other
use cases as discussed in [69]. We describe the implementation architecture for the
context profiler. We then describe several experiments using a previously available
dataset based on which we select concrete parameters for our prototype of the context
profiler. We provide an evaluation of our model and discuss limitations and possible
enhancements.
3.1 Concepts and Design
3.1.1 Context Profiling
Detecting Contexts of Interest
A context of interest (CoI) represents a context that is significant to the user. In
this chapter, we limit our scope to geolocational contexts only. We use a grid-based
clustering algorithm for GPS observations to detect CoIs, which are regions where
the device has been present su ciently often. A CoI is represented by a circular
region with a fixed radius centered at the centroid of the locational observations
contributing to the CoI. Once a CoI is detected, we update its centroid with every new
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observation that falls within the CoI. It should be noted that the clustering module
can be replaced by other sophisticated clustering schemes (such as density based
clustering) that detect contexts of arbitrary shapes. Our profiling framework only
requires a mapping of current position to a CoI so that it can maintain a familiarity
profile of that CoI. We choose grid based clustering since it is lightweight and e cient.
Device Familiarity
A user may observe certain devices more often than others in a given CoI. These
devices gradually become familiar to the user’s device with respect to that particular
CoI. We introduce the notion of familiarity of a device in a given CoI (hereafter
device familiarity) as a measure of how frequently and how recently a device has
been observed by the user’s device in a given CoI. If a familiar device stops appearing
in a CoI for a long time, its device familiarity should gradually decrease. Since we
do not know if the device has left the CoI permanently or is temporarily absent, the
device decay should be slow and gradual. This is achieved by growing the device
familiarity of device d in CoI C with every observation of C that includes d, but
decaying d only if it has not been observed in N0 successive observations of C, where
N0 is a suitably chosen constant. We capture this behavior of device familiarity using
a variation of exponential moving average function as represented by equation 3.1
below.
Definition 3.1.1 Device familiarity of a device d, with respect to CoI C after n
observations of C is:
DFam(d, C, n) = ↵D ⇤ occ(d, C, n) + (1  ↵D) ⇤ DFam(d, C, n  1)
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where,
occ(d, C, n) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if d is observed in C in the nth sample,
0 if d is not observed in C in the nth sample,
and (n Nlast) mod N0 = 0.
DFam(d, C, n  1) otherwise.
(3.1)
where d was last seen in the Nlast
th sample of C.
The selection of the smoothing factor ↵D determines the weight 1  ↵D assigned
to the old device familiarity value in computing the new device familiarity value. For
example, for a device present in every observation made in a CoI, higher values for
↵D would imply quicker rise in the device familiarity value.
Context Familiarity
We estimate the familiarity of a CoI using two measures: instantaneous familiarity
and aggregate familiarity. Instantaneous familiarity is an estimate of the familiarity
of the CoI the user’s device is currently in, in terms of the device familiarity values of
the devices present in the CoI at that instant. Aggregate familiarity represents the
“usual” or “typical” familiarity of a CoI over time.
Instantaneous familiarity is computed as a weighted average of the observed de-
vices with their device familiarity values constituting the corresponding weights. The
intuition is that the contribution of a device towards instantaneous familiarity of a
CoI should be proportional to its device familiarity in that CoI. We compute the in-
stantaneous context familiarity separately for each class of devices and combine them
by taking the average over all device classes. Currently we consider two classes of
devices: Bluetooth and WiFi.
Definition 3.1.2 Instantaneous familiarity of a CoI C at its nth observation can
be defined as
instFam(C, n) = 1|T |
X
t2T
instFam(C, n, t) (3.2)
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where T is the set of device classes,




and DC,n,t is the set of devices of class t 2 T observed in C at its nth observation.
Aggregate familiarity of a CoI represents its “typical” familiarity and is computed as
an exponential moving average of instantaneous familiarity.
Definition 3.1.3 Aggregate familiarity of a CoI C after n observations of C is
defined as:
aggFam(C, n) = ↵C ⇤ instFam(C, n) + (1  ↵C) ⇤ aggFam(C, n  1) (3.3)
where 0  ↵C  1 is a suitably chosen constant.
The smoothing factor ↵C determines how fast the aggregate familiarity should react
to the changes in instantaneous familiarity. A higher value implies quicker reaction.
In section 3.3, we discuss the choice of ↵D and ↵C values used in equations 3.1 and
3.3.
Notion of Null Device
An interesting question is how to interpret the instantaneous familiarity when no
device is observed in a context. We model the absence of any other device by intro-
ducing the notion of a null device for each class of devices. A null device is introduced
when no other device in that device class is observed. The device familiarity of a null
device is computed in just the same way as for a real device using equation 3.1. Thus,
in CoIs where absence of other devices is the norm, the null devices will have a high
device familiarity which in turn leads to familiarity of the CoI to be high when no de-
vices are present. On the other hand, in other CoIs, the familiarity of the null device
will be low which causes the familiarity of the CoI to drop when no other devices are
observed.
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Inferring Context in absence of GPS Fix
Sometimes, especially indoors, the device may fail to get a GPS fix. But we still
need to infer the current context since access control has to be enforced. WiFi- and
cell-tower-based localization is typically used for positioning in the absence of GPS.
This requires the device to scan the neighborhood for WiFi access points or cell-tower
identifiers and map them to a geospatial location with the help of a central server.
Given our design principle of not allowing any context data to leave the device, we
prefer not to rely on server-assisted positioning.
Instead, we use purely local mechanisms to infer the user’s context. The snapshot
of (stationary) WiFi devices observed in a CoI is fairly static and can be used to
attribute user’s current position to a known CoI. We also leverage the fact that the
instantaneous WiFi familiarity score of a CoI represents how familiar the current
snapshot of WiFi devices is to this CoI to map a WiFi snapshot to its most familiar
CoI.
Inference of user’s context is done in two steps. First, we compute candidate
instantaneous WiFi familiarity for the current snapshot of WiFi devices with respect
to all known CoIs for the user. We use a minimum threshold for WiFi instantaneous
familiarity to discard obviously incorrect CoI choices. The current position is then
attributed to the CoI with maximum WiFi instantaneous familiarity score. If none
of the candidate instantaneous familiarity scores exceed the minimum familiarity
threshold, we use Jaccard’s distance measure to compute the distance between the
current snapshot of WiFi devices and the snapshot of WiFi devices corresponding to
the last known observation with an associated GPS reading. If the twoWiFi snapshots
are close enough, we attribute the current observation to the same location.
From Familiarity to Safety
Familiarity can have di↵erent interpretations in terms of safety for di↵erent appli-
cations. A familiar place may be considered safe by a certain application, and unsafe
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by some other application. For example, applications where anonymity is desired
would treat a familiar place as unsafe and an unfamiliar place as safe. On the other
hand, a configurable device lock mechanism would treat an unfamiliar place as unsafe.
Perception of safety can also vary from user to user: two di↵erent users co-located
in the same context may perceive di↵erent safety levels for the exact same context.
In other words, how best to infer the safety level from the familiarity estimates is a
di cult question. Below, we outline the current, somewhat simplistic, approach we
have taken for mapping from familiarity to safety. This remains an active area of
current work for us.
We propose a familiarity to safety mapping for device lock and other applications
with similar requirements. For device lock, we need to assess the safety level of the
current context of the device so that the appropriate locking timeout and unlocking
method can be enforced. We define the security model for device lock application as
follows. The goal is to prevent anyone other than the owner from misusing the device
in an unlocked state. This can be done either by a thief who has stolen a device or
a curious individual. Misuse of device may involve access to personal information,
installation of malware/spyware and using user’s credentials to carry out transactions
maliciously.
Studies [70, 71] in various contexts have shown that familiarity breeds trust and
reduces the risk perception. Further, statistics reported by Bureau of Justice [72] for
year 2006 indicate that at least 59.2% of theft crimes were performed by strangers.
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that in the case of applications like device lock,
the presence of strangers implies a potentially unsafe situation. We begin with the
following intuition: a CoI that has a high familiarity both typically and currently is
probably safe; as a dual, a CoI that has a low familiarity both typically and currently
is probably unsafe.
We incorporate the above observations in our algorithm to estimate the safety
level of the current context (Figure 3.1). The algorithm uses the instantaneous and
aggregate familiarity of the current CoI to estimate the safety level as one of high
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Figure 3.1. Familiarity-to-safety mappings
(GREEN), medium (YELLOW) or low (RED). To do this, we use two thresholds: a
high familiarity threshold (HT ) and a low familiarity threshold (LT ) to delimit “high”
and “low” values for familiarity (both instantaneous and aggregate). In section 3.3,
we estimate reasonable values for these thresholds.
If the current context does not correspond to a CoI, we conclude that the safety
level is low (RED). This is consistent with algorithm in Figure 3.1 because the aggre-
gate familiarity of an unknown context is zero.
Device Lock Use-case
The inferred safety level can be used to automatically configure the unlock policy
for a device lock. We map each safety level to a di↵erent unlocking method and
locking timeout. For instance, GREEN safety may correspond to “slide-to-unlock”
method which is less secure and more usable while RED safety may correspond to
a more secure PIN-based unlock method. We couple this with a low watermark
approach to decide the unlocking method: if a device is locked in a safe context, a
change in context can lock it deeper (i.e., requiring a stronger unlocking method),
but the converse is not true. The unlocking method will correspond to the safety of
the least safe context encountered since the device was locked. This low watermark
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approach is also intended as a defense against adversarial learning: for example, if a
thief steals the device from an unsafe location but leaves it in house for a day, the
context profiler will eventually learn that the thief’s house is a “safe” place, but that
does not help the thief because he has to first unlock the device using the stronger
unlocking method.
3.1.2 Handling User Feedback
In automated access control enforcement, it is important to incorporate feedback
from the user in the decision making process. Since our context profiler’s safety
algorithm ultimately bases its computations only on a few classes of sensor inputs,
it may sometimes estimate the safety level incorrectly. User feedback is important in
such cases so that the inferencing process can be tweaked to match user’s expectations.
Similarly, user feedback can be used to shortcut the learning process so that contexts
that the user knows will become eventually familiar (like her home) can be deemed
familiar more quickly.
A user can provide feedback by specifying the safety level of a context as perceived
by him. The user may provide feedback on the long-term behavior of a CoI by marking
it as ‘Usually safe’ or ‘Usually unsafe’. Alternatively, he may want to indicate a short-
term or temporary feedback like ‘Now safe’ or ‘Now unsafe’ for the current CoI. When
a user provides ‘Usually safe’ feedback for the current CoI, he is also prompted to
provide ‘Now Safe’ feedback, if appropriate. This provides a quick boost to the short
term safety value.
Feedback classification: The safety feedback provided by a user can be broadly
classified into following categories:
1. Learning phase feedback: This feedback is provided by the user during the learn-
ing phase to shortcut learning, or to override the context profiler’s estimations
of the safety of a context until that context has been learned. We believe that
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this would be the most frequent case where user will provide feedback. A user
may provide either short term or long term feedback during learning phase.
2. A rmative feedback: This refers to the scenario where the user feedback matches
the context profiler’s perception of safety, that is the user just re-a rms the con-
text profiler’s perception. For example, when user says that certain context is
‘Usually safe’ and the context profiler has already inferred the context as safe.
We can safely ignore this feedback in the computation of safety scores.
3. Corrective feedback: This refers to the scenario when the context profiler fails
to match user’s perception of safety even after it has learned the context. Cor-
rective feedback can be either short term or long term.
We base our feedback handling approach on the following two principles:
1. The e↵ect of feedback should be immediately visible to the user. However, it
should not permanently relax the safety computations, but allow for the system
to react in case of sudden drops in familiarity scores.
2. When a user provides feedback, it is regarding the safety of a context and not
its familiarity. Thus, the feedback handling mechanism should only tweak the
familiarity to safety mapping and not the familiarity scores themselves.
We extend the basic familiarity-to-safety algorithm presented in Figure 3.1 to
incorporate user feedback. To address the above principles, the instantaneous and
aggregate familiarity scores are artificially boosted according to the feedback provided.
These modified scores (referred to as instFamF and aggFamF in the discussion that
follows) replace the original familiarity scores used in Figure 3.1.
Long term feedback reflects on the ‘typical’ behavior of a context. Our intuition is
that such feedback would be provided in the learning phase to shortcut the learning
process. The e↵ect of long-term feedback should correct the safety computations until
the context has been properly learned. This can be achieved by combining long term
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feedback and the aggregate familiarity using a dynamic weight wLT that gradually
fades away. We use a time decay curve to decay the value of wLT .
Definition 3.1.4 aggFamF is the feedback adjusted score that replaces the aggregate
familiarity score in algorithm in Fig 3.1. It is computed as:
aggFamF (C, n) = (1  wLT ) ⇤ aggFam(C, n) + wLT ⇤ LT Feedback (3.4)
where LT Feedback indicates long term feedback, with value either 0 (‘Usually un-
safe’ ) or 1 (‘Usually safe’ ).







if nf  Nf
0 otherwise.
(3.5)
where nf is the number of observations since the long term feedback was given,
Nf is the maximum number of observations after which the feedback e↵ect should
wear o↵ and c is a constant that determines the speed of decay.
The long term feedback weight should decay slowly in the beginning so that the
device has enough time to learn the context and then gradually fade away to 0. The
constant Nf is decided based on the length of learning period, which depends on
the ↵C and ↵D values. One may question as to why long term feedback should be
forgotten over time. Permanently overriding the profiler’s decision by user’s feedback
prevents the profiler from reacting to genuine drops in safety of a usually safe CoI
(for example, a party at home). Thus, we chose slow decay of long term feedback to
allow adaptive measures instead of permanent override.
Short term feedback reflects on the safety of current snapshot of a CoI. It indicates
a temporary change in the behavior of a CoI and should fade away after a short
time. We compute this score by combining short term feedback and instantaneous
familiarity using a dynamic weight wST .
Definition 3.1.5 instFamF is the feedback adjusted score that replaces the instanta-
neous familiarity score in algorithm in Fig 3.1. It is computed as:
instFamF (C, n) = (1  wST ) ⇤ instFam(C, n) + wST ⇤ ST Feedback (3.6)
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where ST Feedback indicates short term feedback, with value either 0 (‘Now unsafe’ )
or 1 (‘Now safe’ ).
The short term dynamic weight wST should depend on the time elapsed and the
change in the snapshot of observed devices since the feedback was given.
wST =
8<: 1 max { t t0tmax t0 ,Dist(St, St0)} if t  tmax0 otherwise. (3.7)
where t0 is time at which short term feedback was given, t is the current time,
tmax is time after which short term e↵ect should wear o↵ (we use tmax = 60 mins.),
St0 is the snapshot of devices at time t0, St is snapshot of devices at time t and Dist()
is the distance metric, the definition of which is based on the following rationale:
• Familiar devices in St0 , but not St should increase the distance measure
• Unfamiliar devices in St but not in St0 should increase the distance measure
• Unfamiliar transient devices in St0 , but not in St should not increase the distance
measure
• Familiar devices in St but not in St0 should not increase the distance measure
Let n denote the number of observations of context C at current time t and
occ(d, S1, S2) = 1 if device d 2 (S1  S2) and 0 otherwise. Then we define1











(1 DFam(di, C, n)) ⇤ occ(di, St, St0)
1CCCA (3.8)
The e↵ective safety level is inferred as shown in Figure 3.1 where instFamF and
aggFamF will serve the purpose of instantaneous and aggregate familiarity respec-
tively.
1We could define Dist() simply as the Jaccard distance J (St0 , St), but that will not distinguish
devices based on familiarity.
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3.2 System Architecture
The system architecture for the context profiler software is described in Figure 3.2.
It consists of three main modules:
• Data Collection module is responsible for continuously sensing the current
context and collecting raw data about various context variables
• CoI Detection module periodically clusters the location data collected by the
data collection module to detect CoIs for the user, based on their significance
to the user which is determined by the amount of time the user spends in a
particular place.
• Context Analysis module is responsible for analyzing the raw data and infer
familiarity and safety scores for the current context. For each CoI, it maintains
a context profile to keep track of the devices that are observed in a CoI and
their familiarity scores with respect to that CoI. Based on the current snapshot
of the CoI, it computes instantaneous and aggregate familiarity scores using
equations 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. These familiarity scores are used to infer the
safety of the context as discussed earlier.
In our current implementation, the data collection module scans the environment
every five minutes to record the GPS co-ordinates (if available) as well as the currently
visible Bluetooth devices and WiFi access points. This information is stored in a
database on the device itself and is used by other modules to identify and analyze
CoIs. This module can be extended to sense other kinds of context variables.
For CoI detection, we used a simple grid-based clustering algorithm with a grid
cell width of 250 meters. We required a cluster to have at least 1% of all observations
within a time window of 30 days which corresponds to 8640 observations at our current
rate of sampling. Consequently, the detection threshold of 1% (⇡ 86 observations)
would correspond to roughly an equivalent of seven hours of observations of a place


















Figure 3.2. System components: (1) Data collection module collects
GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi data; (2) GPS data is clustered to detect CoIs;
(3) Context analysis module updates context-specific information and
(4) computes familiarity and safety scores for the current context.
as a CoI. We associated Bluetooth and WiFi observations having a GPS fix within
100 meters from a cluster’s centroid as belonging to that CoI. Note that a CoI is a
circle with a fixed (100m) radius and is significantly smaller than a grid cell. The
grid cells are used only to speed up clustering and do not dictate the size of a CoI.
The context analysis module periodically generates the familiarity and safety
scores for the current context. These values can be used by applications to auto-
matically configure access policies that depend on the current context. In the device
locking use case, the safety scores are used to dynamically configure the unlocking
method and the locking timeout of the device.
3.3 Parameter Tuning
We ran several experiments using traces from the Lausanne Data Collection Cam-
paign, a large-scale data collection experiment focusing on mobile device users’ be-
havioral and contextual data traces [73,74] in order to gain the insights and heuristics
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needed to determine suitable parameters for a concrete instantiation of the context
profiler framework. The dataset contains GPS location traces and regular scans of
WiFi and Bluetooth radio environments of a large number of users.
To match our device implementation as closely as possible, we filtered the dataset
to include one Bluetooth and WiFi scan observation per five-minute observation win-
dow, if available. Each of these Bluetooth/WiFi observations was matched with the
closest GPS fix within the time window, if available. By applying our CoI identifica-
tion algorithms, we identified a total of 167 CoIs for 37 users, giving on average 5.22
CoIs per user (median 5 CoIs).
In the device lock scenario, the context profiler e↵ects visible to the end user are
(a) how long does it take for a safe CoI to be recognized as such by the context profiler
and (b) how volatile is the safety labeling of a safe CoI. As a guiding principle, we
want the context profiler to learn safe CoIs within two days. At our current sampling
frequency of every five minutes, a day consists of 288 observations. We conjectured
that a user is likely to spend about a third of a day in a given safe CoI. Thus we
need safe CoIs to be deemed safe in about 200 observations. We set this as our
approximate target. We then determined suitable values for various parameters as
discussed below.
Smoothing factor for Device familiarity ↵D: From Equation 3.1 we see that
higher values for ↵D will imply that the device familiarity DFam will grow quickly if
a device continues to appear in successive samples in a CoI. Given our rough target
of recognizing a safe CoI within 200 observations, we decided to select ↵d so that a
device that appears in about 20 consecutive samples of a CoI would have a DFam
reaching 0.9. Using Equation 3.1, we compute this value of ↵D to be 0.1. This is in
line with the standard practice of choosing a smoothing factor between 0.05 and 0.3
for processes that are locally constant (Chapter 8 of [75]).
Decay interval for Device familiarity N0: To select the value of N0 in equa-
tion 3.1, we reasoned that the familiarity of a device should decay if it did not show
up even once in consecutive samples spanning a day. Again, based on the assumption
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that a user may spend about a third of a day (⇡ 96 observations) in a given safe CoI,
we chose N0 to be 100.
Smoothing factor for Context familiarity ↵C : In Equation 3.3 the smoothing
factor ↵C a↵ects the lag time of the smoothing applied to the aggregate familiarity
scores. The lag time determines the number of observations required for the aggre-
gate familiarity score to react to changes in the trend of the instantaneous familiarity
scores. Consequently, the choice of ↵C will impact both the user-visible e↵ects dis-
cussed above.
We presume that most users have at least two frequently visited CoIs (e.g. their
home and workplace). We further assume that the majority of such CoIs can be
presumed to be ‘familiar’ places for the users. We denote the set of the top-two most
frequently observed CoIs of each user as the set of frequent CoIs. We studied how dif-
ferent choices of ↵C a↵ects the evolution of the aggregate familiarity score in frequent
CoIs over time. Figure 3.3 shows the result: the y-axis on the left shows the average
aggregate familiarity for frequent CoIs; the y-axis on the right shows the average of
the standard deviation of the aggregate familiarity of the same, calculated over the
latest 100 observations at each point. We observed the following from Figure 3.3:
• values of ↵C greater than 0.05 have little impact in the behavior of the average
aggregate familiarity score.
• the “knee” in the graph near the 200th observation implies that most of the
frequent CoIs reach a steady state after this point.
• the average standard deviation of aggregate familiarity scores is reasonably small
(less than 5%) for all values of ↵C less than 0.05 beyond the steady state.
Based on these results, we chose ↵C as 0.05.
Long term feedback duration Nf : The number of observations for frequent
CoIs to reach steady state (200) is a suitable value for Nf in equation 3.5.
Safety thresholds HT and LT : In Figure 3.1, a natural value for HT is the
point reached by the average aggregate score of frequent CoIs at the steady state.
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Figure 3.3. Behavior of aggregate familiarity score in frequent CoIs
From Figure 3.3, this is 0.85. To choose the value of the low threshold LT , we used
the following rationale. We expect that for most users, a familiar CoI like home
will exhibit stable behavior in the long-term. Thus we can choose LT such that the
aggregate familiarity score of most familiar CoIs will be above this value. We resort
to a 90-10 rule of thumb to assume that 90 percent of the set of frequent CoIs are
likely to be stable. Figure 3.4 shows the aggregate familiarity score of the CoI at the
lowest tenth percentile for a given number of observations. From the graph, we can
see that 0.4 appears to be a good choice for LT because at all times after reaching the
steady state (refer to Figure 3.3), all frequent CoIs in the set above the 10th percentile
have aggregate familiarity scores above this value.
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Figure 3.4. Determining the low threshold
Table 3.1.
Classifications of place labels in ground truth data
Safe Unsafe
My home Holiday resort or vacation spot
My freetime home Shop or shopping center
My main workplace Location related to transportation (e.g. bus stop)
Place for indoor sports (e.g. gym)
Place for outdoor sports (e.g. walking)
Unclassified
Home of a friend My main school or college place
My other work place Other
I don’t know
3.4 Validation of the Model
3.4.1 Comparison to Ground Truth
Once the parameters were determined, we applied our familiarity and safety al-
gorithms to the observation data related to the frequent CoIs of each user. Ideally,
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Table 3.2.
Sets used in validation
Sets in ground truth data #
Observations in “Safe” CoIs Gsafe 51446
Observations in “Unsafe” CoIs Gunsafe 2607
Observations in Unclassified CoIs GUC 10119
Sets identified by Context Profiler #
“Safe” observations CGREEN 55234
“Unsafe”observations CRED 2862
Neither CY ELLOW 6076
Set intersections #
True “Safe” obs. |Gsafe \ CGREEN | 47197
Other “Safe” obs. |{Gunsafe [GUC} \ CGREEN | 8037
True “Unsafe” obs. |Gunsafe \ CRED| 889
Other “Unsafe” obs. |{Gsafe [GUC} \ CRED| 1973
the evaluation of the model would be based on ground truth information indicating
the user’s perception of the safety of a CoI over time. Unfortunately the dataset we
used did not have ground truth information at this granularity. However, it did have
information where the users have labeled locations using one of several pre-defined
labels such as “My home”, “My main work place”, “Shop” etc. We grouped these
labels into “safe” and “unsafe” as shown in Table 3.1. We ignored locations with
labels whose safety classification from a user’s perspective is unclear (e.g., labels such
as “Home of a friend”). Making the simplifying assumption that the CoIs identified
by the users as “safe” or “unsafe” in the ground truth data are always safe or unsafe
respectively, we estimated the e↵ectiveness of the context profiler with the parame-
ters selected above as follows. We identified the sets as in Table 3.2. Note that this
labeling information we now use for the validation of the model was not part of the
data we used in choosing the parameters for the model in section 3.3.
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Table 3.3.
Metrics for “safe” situations
Formula value
Precision |Gsafe\CGREEN ||CGREEN | 0.854
Recall |Gsafe\CGREEN ||Gsafe| 0.917
Fallout w.r.t. “unsafe” |Gunsafe\CGREEN ||Gunsafe| 0.152
Fallout w.r.t. “unclassified” |GUC\CGREEN ||GUC | 0.755
Table 3.4.




Fallout w.r.t “safe” |Gsafe\CRED||Gsafe| 0.019
Fallout w.r.t “unclassified” |GUC\CRED||GUC | 0.096
We then calculated the figures of merit for recognizing “safe” and “unsafe” situa-
tions as shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively.
The precision and recall of recognizing safe situations are su ciently high. The
fallout value reflecting the likelihood of unsafe CoIs receiving ‘safe’ classifications is
slightly higher than desirable (15%), but still in acceptable range. The fallout with
regard to ‘unclassified’ CoIs is remarkably high (75%). This may be caused by the
fact that a major fraction of the CoIs in the ‘unclassified’ set GUC actually represent
places that are familiar to the user (e.g. ‘Home of a friend’,or, ‘My other work place’
might be such places). The precision of recognizing unsafe situations is low, but
acceptable as it errs on the safe side. The recall is low, implying that the context
profiler recognized only a third of the unsafe observations as such. However, among
the 6076 YELLOW observations made by the context profiler (the set CY ELLOW ),
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Figure 3.5. Device implementation: Feedback options and inferred safety
this set with CRED, then the recall figure climbs up to 0.848. This suggests that the
YELLOW safety level should not be considered significantly safer than RED. Overall,
the figures of merit validate the choice of parameters.
3.4.2 Implementation
We have prototyped the context profiler with the chosen parameters on Linux-
based smartphones (Nokia N900 and N9). We also implemented three di↵erent un-
locking methods (passcode, draw-a-secret, and slider) which were linked to the RED,
YELLOW, and GREEN safety levels respectively. The three safety levels also cor-
responded to three di↵erent default timeout values of 1 minute, 5 minutes and 30
minutes respectively.
3.4.3 E↵ect of User Feedback
We studied the e↵ect of user feedback using our prototype context profiler. The
user can provide feedback about a CoI’s safety at any time to modify its behavior































Figure 3.6. E↵ect of user feedback during learning
feedback that was provided by the user for a context when the context profiler was
still in learning phase. The user provided ‘Usually safe’ feedback after approximately
20 observations of this CoI. At this point, the aggregate familiarity was artificially
boosted to a value 1 (h˜igh) and this boost was decayed slowly. As can be seen in this
figure, the e↵ective familiarity stayed high until the CoI was learnt. Thus, the user
could shortcut the learning phase by providing a long term feedback.
The graph shows the e↵ect of using di↵erent c values in equation 3.5. While a
bigger value of c provides a steady behavior until CoI has been learnt, it also reduces
the CoI’s tolerance to genuine drops in instantaneous familiarity. To address this
tradeo↵ and from the behavior of aggFamF in Figure 3.6, we decide to use c = 2.
3.5 Discussion
Alternate safety algorithm
The safety algorithm discussed in Fig. 3.1 can be further strengthened by incor-
porating volatility of the CoI as a factor. CoIs that are stable (less volatile) should
be less tolerant to changes in instantaneous familiarity. Even small changes should
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Figure 3.7. Safety algorithm with variance
severely a↵ect the perceived safety of a stable CoI. Similarly, CoIs with high variance
should be more tolerant to fluctuations. The variance of instantaneous familiarity
can be an indicator for the volatility of a CoI. A context can be deemed volatile if
the variance is above a certain threshold. To incorporate volatility of a CoI in the
safety algorithm, we use its modified version as shown in Fig 3.7. This algorithm is
not used when the user feedback is in e↵ect, since the volatility of the CoI cannot be
reliably determined in such cases.
Privacy Considerations
Collection of user’s contextual data by di↵erent services usually raises privacy
concerns. However, in our approach this data collection is used to help users in
intuitive enforcement of access control and never leaves the device’s storage.
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Security Considerations
The security requirements of context profiling depends on the application. An
attacker who can fake Bluetooth or WiFi addresses can influence the estimated famil-
iarity scores. This can be addressed by revising the familiarity calculations by giving
greater weights to devices whose identities are cryptographically verifiable based on
existing security associations with those devices. For the device lock application this
is not a significant concern because we target users like Alice (described in the In-
troduction chapter) who do not use any device lock in the first place. Compared to
this starting point, if the use of the context profiler improves the perceived usability
of device lock for such users, it can only improve the security!
Unknown Contexts
In the current implementation, as discussed earlier, an unknown context is treated
as unsafe. This is logical because there is no notion of aggregate familiarity for an
unknown context. However, this approach may be too pessimistic: one can plausibly
make the argument that the familiarity of an unknown context where all devices
present are highly familiar should be high. Since we already keep track of the number
of times a device has been seen in all contexts from which we can estimate the global
familiarity of a device and use those to estimate the familiarity of unknown contexts.
The exact formulation is left as future work.
3.6 Limitations
Energy Considerations
Continuous context profiling comes at a cost of increased battery consumption.
This limitation can be overcome by using intelligent sampling techniques. For ex-
ample, instead of performing frequent GPS scanning, one could use accelerometer
triggered scanning so that GPS is turned on only when motion is detected. Another
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technique to conserve battery could be to use WiFi access points to detect geo-location
instead of GPS. Our initial prototype does not incorporate these enhancements yet.
However, intelligent sampling would be highly desirable in a usable product.
Corrective Long Term Feedback
For long term user feedback, in addition to “usually unsafe”, it is reasonable to let
the user assert “always unsafe” in a CoI so that that CoI is tagged as unsafe regardless
of the familiarity calculation. Similarly, if we can develop a metric to measure the
“similarity” of CoIs, then when a user asserts a CoI as “unsafe”, that may be a cue
to infer that the user may assert the same in “similar” CoIs.
Suitable Ground Truth Data
Although the analysis we performed in Section 3.4.1 gives us some confidence
that our approach is valid, it su↵ers from the fact that the ground truth data we had
available to us was not fine-grained enough. To get more accurate ground truth data
we would need to conduct a targeted user study.
Intelligibility
A common concern in context-aware systems is “intelligibility” [76]: they should
be able to explain to the users the bases and implications of the inferences they make.
We have taken some steps towards intelligibility of the context profiler (like showing
inferred safety level and the familiarity scores used in the inference), we need a more
thorough analysis of how to make the context profiler more intelligible.
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3.7 Conclusion
We described a context profiler which uses location traces to detect places of
interest for a user and profiles the Bluetooth and WiFi devices in such places to
estimate the familiarity of a place. We showed how familiarity can be used to infer
safety and use this safety score to make access control decisions. Our context profiler
incorporates user feedback to shortcut learning and temporarily modify the behavior
of our system. We chose parameters of the context profiler by running experiments
using a large dataset and evaluated the e↵ectiveness of our approach using ground
truth data from the dataset. We have prototyped the context profiler on smartphones.
Although this work focuses on a particular use case, we believe that our notion
of using context profiling to infer security policies is a powerful tool. It can ease
the cognitive burden on ordinary users in setting and managing appropriate security
policies on mass-market personal devices. We believe that there are many other
applications besides device lock that can benefit from this approach: for example,
guiding the user towards context-appropriate consumption of content (e.g., warning
users when they are about to open e-mail tagged as confidential while they are in
a public place or when they are about to surf to a website labeled as not-safe-for-
work when they are at work). We hope that this work raises the discussion on such
applications and motivates fellow researchers to design them.
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4 A FORMAL PROXIMITY MODEL FOR RBAC SYSTEMS
The rise of mobile and pervasive computing has made it possible to devise context-
aware systems that customize the computing experience to the user’s environment.
One particular application for these systems is to facilitate the design of access control
systems that aim to mitigate the threat of data loss by restricting permissions to
appropriate settings. As these concerns are more relevant to enterprise settings,
researchers often use RBAC as the foundation for designing such access control models
and systems. For instance, several models have been proposed that consider the
requesting user’s location in the policy decision [16, 19,21].
While such extensions to RBAC can provide a basis for reasoning about contex-
tual policies, they fail to reflect many of the more interesting scenarios. Specifically,
it may be more important to consider the relative locations of other users, rather
than the requesting user’s location. For instance, when preparing a financial deposit
slip in a retail setting, the presence of a supervisor in the same room as the employee
may be more important than just ensuring that the employee is present in the store
o ce. To enable the creation of such policies, Prox-RBAC [2] was proposed to in-
corporate proximity constraints into a spatial RBAC model. That is, Prox-RBAC
policies consisted of a spatial RBAC policy with an additional clause specifying con-
straints on the locations of other users; for instance, one can specify a constraint
for a military deployment that no civilians be present. However, Prox-RBAC o↵ered
only an informal view of proximity, and unnecessarily restricted the domain to spatial
concerns.
In this work, we present a more rigorous definition of proximity based on formal
topological relations. In addition, we show that this definition can be applied to sev-
eral additional domains, such as social networks, communication channels, attributes,
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and time; thus, our policy model and language is more flexible and powerful than the
previous work.
In addition to defining the model, we also present a number of theoretical results
and practical advice for the creation of proximity-based RBAC systems. We propose
three enforcement architectures in this work to accommodate di↵erent types of feature
acquisition and communication approaches. We also provide templates for enforce-
ment protocols for these architectures, formalize these protocols using PCL [77] and
prove security properties of these protocols. In doing so, we also highlight the the-
oretical limits of correct enforcement of proximity constraints. We show that, given
a single policy with proximity constraints, determining whether or not it can be sat-
isfied is NP-hard. Furthermore, if the mapping of users to features can be done in
polynomial time, then the problem is NP-complete. We also show that correct evalu-
ation of proximity constraints is impossible if the deployment allows for asynchronous
communication.
However, despite these results, practical deployments are still feasible. Specifically,
the NP-hard result depends on the complexity of the proximity constraints; if only
simple proximity constraints are used, evaluating the policy design becomes tractable.
The impossibility result, on the other hand, applies to the simultaneous evaluation
of the constraint for a request while another user changes features. That is, there is
a small window of time when the policy information point (PIP) has an inconsistent
view of the system. Note, though, that this is only relevant if the user who is changing
features has some impact on the proximity constraint under consideration; if that user
is not relevant to the current policy, this inconsistency has no e↵ect on the policy
decision. One can further mitigate this threat of inconsistency with redundancy; that
is, by repeating the constraint evaluation after a small window of time. Thus, while
perfect guarantees are impossible, the system may be able to enforce the policies well
enough for practical concerns.
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4.1 Concepts and Design
We begin this section by developing an intuitive understanding of proximity and
realms. Once we have sketched these preliminary concepts, we define a formal prox-
imity model and show how to map the realms to it. In doing so, we illustrate the
flexibility of our model, which shows that one could adapt the same ideas to other
realms of interest.
4.1.1 Intuition of Proximity
The notion of proximity can be informally defined as the nearness of two entities.
These entities are active, that is they can execute actions on protected resources. Tra-
ditionally, this nearness of entities is understood in terms of physical distance, though
other frames of reference, such as time, may be used. In order to use proximity as a
foundational concept for access control, it is necessary to provide a formal definition
that is flexible enough to accommodate various application scenarios. Before provid-
ing our definition, we will first describe five types of proximity so as to illustrate the
intuition behind our formalism. Specifically, we will discuss the following types of
proximity:
Geographical proximity indicates that two entities are located within a certain
distance in the physical space.
Attribute-based proximity indicates that two entities share one or more common
attributes, or are both located in regions of physical space that share attributes.
Social proximity indicates that two entities (represented by nodes in a social net-
work graph) are less than a certain number of hops apart.
Cyber proximity indicates that two entities are co-present in the same online com-
munication session.
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Temporal proximity indicates that two entities are present for events separated
by a limited amount of time.
Geographical Proximity
This type of proximity is perhaps the most conventional. The entities reside at
specific locations in the physical world. The distance between the entities may be
measured in traditional terms, such as Euclidean distance or Manhattan distance.
Alternatively, the distance may be measured in logical units that are defined based
on a partitioning of the reference space; for example, in an indoor space, the number
of rooms separating the two entities may quantify the distance. Regardless of the
measurement used, the notion of proximity implies that the distance is less than a
certain threshold value. To illustrate access control based on geographical proximity,
consider a policy that specifies that users must be present in the same room. A
wireless sensor network could be used to track users’ positions and verify that the
constraint is satisfied. Another policy could specify that users must be within a certain
number of meters of each other. This policy could be enforced using a technology
such as Bluetooth, which indirectly vouches for the nearness of the users.
Attribute-based Proximity
In attribute based proximity model, each entity has a set of attributes that char-
acterize certain properties or personal traits of this entity. These attributes can be
encoded in credentials such as certificates that attest their validity. Attribute based
proximity indicates the similarity of attributes of two entities. For example, a per-
son with attribute ‘Assistant Professor’ is in attribute based proximity with another
person with attribute ‘Associate professor.’ Weighting values can be associated with
both the credential (i.e., to specify its trustworthiness) or the trait itself (e.g., to
quantify the similarity between values). As another example, consider an online dat-
ing service where a user can choose to share his or her profile with similar users.
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Potential mates with similar political views, religious backgrounds, or hometowns
could be automatically granted access; such a system would be beneficial for helping
users identify potential matches more quickly. In an alternate view, attributes can be
associated with the user’s environment, such as the type of location in the physical
world. The distance metric for proximity, then, would be an empirical measure of
the di↵erence between values, possibly weighted to reflect the veracity of credentials
presented. For instance, if two users are in restaurants, possible attributes may be
the type of restaurant or the name of the chain; if the restaurants share the same
parent company, they would be considered to be in close proximity, regardless of
their physical distance. Other attributes could be the presence of public wi-fi, the
temperature of the surrounding area, or the most popular professional sports team of
the area. Our work allows for both uses of attributes, either relative to the user or
the context.
Social Proximity
The emergent popularity of social networks introduces a new dimension to proxim-
ity. A social network is traditionally modeled as a graph where each user is represented
by a node and the connections between users are represented by edges connecting
them. In the social realm, the distance metric is based on the number of hops that
separate two entities within the social graph. Social proximity of two user indicates
that the distance between them is less than a certain number of hops. In this case, the
distance is relatively static, as changes to the distance only occur when connections
between users change. Although social connections may change often, it is intuitive
that the distance between any two users would change more frequently in the physical
world. Policies based on social proximity are quite common. The most popular is
the restriction of shared data to friends or contacts. In some cases, these restrictions
can be loosened to the next step in the network, such as friends of friends. In other
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cases, data may be shared with other users within sub-networks; for instance, users
may share data with others from the same school or employer.
Cyber Proximity
Two users are said to be in cyber proximity if they are simultaneously involved in
an online communication session. For example, users may be on the same conference
call or may be chatting with one another. The distance metric could be binary,
indicating co-presence in the same session, or based on degrees of separation. In the
latter case, consider three users named Alice, Bob, and Charlie. If Alice and Bob are
chatting while Bob is connected to a conference call with Charlie, then the distance
from Alice to Charlie would be two. Alternatively, if the binary metric is used, Alice
and Charlie would not be in cyber proximity, as they are not present within the same
communication session.
Temporal Proximity
While the previous notions of proximity can clearly be applied to users, temporal
proximity means that two events occur within a certain relative time frame. The
most natural metric would be the passage of units of time. However, in asynchronous
systems, absolute time units may not be used or feasible. Instead, relative units,
such as vector clocks, may be used to specify the ordering of events. In that case, the
distance between two events would be the number of events that occur between them.
An example of access control based on temporal proximity would be the specification
of an expiration date on a contract signature. If another event, such as a signature
by another party, does not occur prior to the expiration date, then the first signature
is considered null and void. Another scenario where temporal proximity could be
applied would be a combination of geo-social networks with missed connections.1
1Missed connections are popular features in publications such as alternative newspapers. One person
sees another in a public place but the opportunity to meet never arises. Instead, the first person
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When a user visits a public place, he may retrieve a token indicating his presence
at that location at that time. This token could then be used to retrieve missed
connections placed by others with the same token.
4.1.2 Hybrid Proximity Realms
Although we do not explicitly model the case, we posit that it would be possible
to create policies for hybrid realms that combine two or more of the above mentioned
realms. For instance, one could consider a realm that combines military ranks, the
bases to which the o cers are assigned, and their connections within particular social
networks. Such a multidimensional policy model would combine elements of attribute,
geographical and social proximities. While our model is su cient to define such a
hybrid realm (i.e., by using appropriate topological relations), crafting appropriate
distance metrics–by mapping realms to a multidimensional coordinate system–would
be application specific. We find attempts at formalizing such a meta-model to be
needlessly complex, and omit this case from further consideration for the present
work.
4.1.3 Formal Proximity Model
Our formal definition of proximity is derived from constructing an abstract space
model S from the reference space models or realms (e.g., the physical world, social net-
works, communication sessions, time) identified in the previous section. Specifically,
we apply the calculus-based method [3] that has been widely used in GIS applications.
We start by showing that this approach is su cient for modeling non-geographic ref-
erence space models.2 We then show how it can be used for proximity-based RBAC
systems.
places a missed connection advertisement with enough contextual information in the hopes that the
other person will read the description and desire to make contact.
2While the original work only defines the method for two-dimensional geographic space, the defini-
tions of the topological relations can be extended for multi-dimensional space, as well.
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Proximity Model
Let S denote a discrete set of closed regions, called features, of the reference space
model. For the feature  i 2 S, @ i denotes the set of boundary points while   
denotes the interior of the feature. Table 4.1 summarizes the formal definitions of
these sets for each realm. For instance, in the geographical space, S would consist of
regions of space that may or may not overlap; e.g, if  i is a room, then @ i would
be the points that constitute the walls.3 The temporal realm would have events–
closed time intervals–as features. Attribute-based proximity is similar, but extends
the linear model to a multi-dimensional one. Features in the social realm would
consist of sub-portions of the social network.
Before we elaborate on our model with additional definitions, we must address the
complexity of the cyber realm. The di culty lies in the fact that the most natural
reference space model would be a hypergraph, with a hyperedge connecting all of the
vertices (users) in the communication session, which cannot be directly mapped onto
our abstract space model as it introduces inconsistencies in the topological relations.
Our solution is to create a parallel hypergraph such that each vertex in the original is
replaced by distinct vertices for each connected hyperedge. The interior would include
the new vertices connected to the hyperedges of interest, and the boundary would be
the other new vertices. For instance, if a user was simultaneously communicating in a
Skype session and two chat sessions, then the feature  i containing the chat sessions
would include the new vertices for the chat sessions in the interior, and the new vertex
for the Skype session would be in the boundary.
Central to our model is the notion of feature type, which can be organized in a
hierarchical manner. Table 4.1 provides examples of types for each realm. Types allow
for system administrators to distinguish between, for instance, a physics exam and a
3Readers familiar with the calculus-based method will note that our abstract space model only
focuses on area/area relationships. This is deliberate, as defining access control policies on single
points or lines seems infeasible in general.
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chemistry exam that occur simultaneously. Feature type can be either conceptual or
unit-based. Conceptual feature types assign a semantic label to a feature while
Table 4.1.: Mapping of realms to abstract space model
Geographical
Elements of S: Sets of points p in physical space
Sample types: Room, Building, Hospital
 i = {p | p is in a featured region }
  i = {p | p is an interior point }
@ i = {p | p is on the region’s boundary }
Attribute
Elements of S: Attribute vectors a = ha1, . . . , aki representing a collection of values for
considered attributes. We also write ai 2A a to indicate ai is one of a1, . . . , ak.
Sample types: {Age, School}, {Age, Profession, Employer}, {Hometown}
 i = {a | 8 ai 2A a, ai is within a specified range for that attribute}
  i = {a 2  i | 8 ai 2A a, ai is strictly within the specified range}
@ i = {a 2  i | 9 ai 2A a, ai has a borderline (maximum or minimum) value for that
attribute}
Social
Elements of S: Sets of edges e 2 E and vertices v 2 V such that G = hV,Ei forms a social
network
Sample types: Friends, Colleagues, Conference attendees
 i = {v 2 V | v is an individual } [ {e = hv1, v2i | v1 2  i _ v2 2  i}
  i = {v 2  i} [ {e 2  i | e = hv1, v2i ^ v1 2  i ^ v2 2  i}
@ i = {e 2  i | e = hv1, v2i ^ (v1 62  i _ v2 62  i)}
Cyber
Elements of S: Sets of hyperedges hˆ 2 bH and vertices vˆ 2 bV given a hypergraph G = hV,Hi
where h 2 H denotes a communication session and v 2 V denotes a user, wherebV , {vˆi,j 2 bV | 9 vi 2 V, hj 2 H s.t. vi 2 hj}bH , {hˆi = {vˆ1,i, . . . , vˆk,i} 2 bH | 9 hi = {v1, . . . , vk} 2 H}
Sample types: VOIP, Skype
 i = {hˆi | hi represents a session}[{vˆl,i 2 hˆi 2  i}[{vˆl,j 2 hˆj 62  i | 9 hˆi 2  i s.t. vˆl,i 2 hˆi}
  i = {hˆ 2  i} [ {vˆl,i 2 hˆi 2  i}
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
@ i = {vˆl,j 2 hˆj 62  i | 9 hˆi 2  i s.t. vˆl,i 2 hˆi}
Temporal
Elements of S: Typed time intervals [ti, tj ]
Sample types: Examination, Meeting, Football game
 i = {e | e is an event associated with some time interval [ti, tj ]}
  i = {t | t   ti ^ t  tj}
@ i = {ti, tj}
unit-based feature types are defined by reference space such as meters (geographical),
hops (social), or minutes (temporal). Realms can have multiple units, but all units
would be considered to be types, and units can only be sub-types of other units;
furthermore, units would be instantiated as distinct features. For instance, in a
temporal space, a feature representing 8:00:00 – 8:00:59 would denote the first minute
at 8:00. Let types denote the set of application-specific feature types for the realm,
and let v denote a sub-typing partial order.
Definition 4.1.1 ⌧ : S ! types denotes a typing function that maps a feature in
abstract space S to feature type. If ⌧( i) = ti, then ti is the type of  i.
The abstract space model can be restricted to only contain features that have
certain types. This may be useful for applications that are only interested in certain
types of features but not others.
Definition 4.1.2 S|t denotes the restriction of features of S ✓ S to those features
with a sub-type of tj 2 t ✓ types:
S|t = { i 2 S | 9 tj 2 t s.t. ⌧( i) v tj}
For instance, S|{exam,mathematics} would contain only time frames representing mathe-
matics exams in a temporal discussion. In a geographical discussion, S|{room} could
denote the rooms in a building.
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We can now use the notion of types, in combination with topological relations, to
define our abstract distance metric. We use a set of six topological relations defined
in [3] to specify the relationships between features of the abstract space. Let T be
this set of topological relations and is defined as
T = {disjoint, in, touch, equal, cover, overlap}
We define a connectivity chain as a sequence of features where no two consecutive
features satisfy the disjoint topological relation.
Definition 4.1.3 The sequence h 0, 1, . . . , n 1, ni denotes a connectivity chain
from the feature  0 to  n, such that ¬h i 1, disjoint, ii for 1  i  n.
Let  ( i, j) denote the set of all connectivity chains from  i to  j, and let  k 2 c
mean that  k occurs in the chain c 2  ( i, j).
Definition 4.1.4  |t( i, j) denotes the restriction of connectivity chains con-
necting features  i and  j to include only intermediate features with a sub-type of
tk 2 t ✓ types:
 |t( i, j) = {c 2  ( i, j) | 8  k 2 c, 9 tl 2 t s.t. ⌧( k) v tl}
Conceptual feature types provide logical measurement (where connectivity chain
is a sequence of features). For instance,  |{room}( i, j) would only consist of chains
of rooms that connect the two features. Alternatively, unit types provide physical
measurement. For instance,  |{minute}( i, j) would contain chains whose intermedi-
ate features are the minutes that occur between the start of  i and the end of  j.
Letting c denote the length of a chain (as measured in the number of intermediate
features), we can define a basic distance metric as length of smallest connectivity
chain connecting two features.
Definition 4.1.5  ( i, j, t) denotes the distance metric between features  i and
 j where the intermediate feature types are restricted to t ✓ types and is defined as:
 ( i, j, t) = min(c) 8c 2  |t( i, j)
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The final element of our proximity model is how to incorporate users. Specifically,
we require some method of mapping users to features. Let U denote the set of users.
Definition 4.1.6 µ : U ! 2S denotes a feature mapping function that maps a
user to set of features.
The power set is required for the codomain as a result of the hierarchical typing of
features. For instance, a user in the social realm may belong to a group of friends, as
well as a group of colleagues. Hence, µ(u) = {friends, colleagues}. It is important to
note that applying µ to the temporal realm is somewhat unintuitive. From a formal
perspective, µ maps that user to all events in which that user participated at any
time. This is due to the nature of the temporal realm. In practice, the temporal µ
would restrict the focus to events within a designated time frame.
Definition 4.1.7 µ|t denotes the restriction of the feature mapping function
to types t ✓ types such that
µ|t(u) = { i 2 µ(u) | 9 tj 2 t s.t. ⌧( i) v tj}
Based on the preceding definitions, we can define a proximity model as M = {S, T ,U , ⌧, µ,  }.
Role Proximity
Using the model M, we can define the notion of role proximity. We start with
the traditional RBAC concepts of roles (R) and users (U). When a user logs into
the system, he is associated with a new session. Let SES denote the set of sessions,
SU : SES ! U the mapping of sessions to users, SR : SES ! 2R the mapping of
sessions to possible roles that could be activated, and Act : U ! 2R the mapping of






where SU 1(u) denotes the preimage of u under SU , i.e., the set of sessions associated
with the user. That is, every one of a user’s active roles must be associated with some
session. We can define two distinct types of role proximity using these definitions.
Definition 4.1.8 A user u 2 U is said to be in (t1, d, t2)-weak role proximity
((t1, d, t2)-wrp) of a role r for t1, t2 2 types and d 2 R+ if 9uˆ 2 U , uˆ 6= u such that
all of these hold:
1. r 2 Act(uˆ)
2.  i 2 µ|{t1}(u)
3.  j 2 µ|{t1}(uˆ)
4.  ( i, j, t2)  d
Weak role proximity, then, considers only users’ active roles. Observe that two feature
types are necessary, as the unit separating the features will most likely have a di↵erent
type than the features themselves. For instance, in social proximity, a manager at one
company may be in (org, 1, friend)-wrp of the CTO of another company if there are
employees of both companies that are friends. In a temporal setting, if a user signs a
document at some meeting, (meeting, 4, hour)-wrp is satisfied if a manager signs the
document at another meeting with no more than 4 hours separating the meetings.
At this point, it is necessary to point out that the temporal realm presents a
unique complication for our definitions as written. Specifically, it is possible that r is
no longer in Act(uˆ) at the time that the constraint needs to be evaluated for user u,
although the proximity constraint should be considered satisfied. The solution, then,
is to emphasize that Act(uˆ) is evaluated at the time that uˆ performs some action4.
For instance, in the preceding example, both the user and the manager must perform
the action of signing the document. This modeling choice is, in essence, syntactic
sugar that allows us to use consistent terminology.
4We note that this problem also arises in asynchronous deployments that work in di↵erent realms.
However, the timing problem is heightened within the temporal realm.
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This interpretation presents a clear engineering challenge, which is determining
how much information about session mappings must be maintained over time. If all
temporal proximity constraints require users to perform actions, then the system must
only log events that occur. On the other hand, if the constraints are passive, i.e., at
least one of the user is not required to perform an explicit action, then the adminis-
trative overhead would be higher–possibly prohibitively high. Consequently, system
designers would have to make appropriate choices for their specific applications.
Definition 4.1.9 A user u 2 U is said to be in (t1, d, t2)-strong role proximity
((t1, d, t2)-srp) of a role r for t1, t2 2 types and d 2 R+ if 9uˆ 2 U , uˆ 6= u such that all
of these hold:
1. r 2 Ss2SU 1(uˆ) SR(s)
2.  i 2 µ|{t1}(u)
3.  j 2 µ|{t1}(uˆ)
4.  ( i, j, t2)  d
That is, strong role proximity considers roles that could be activated during some
session for the user, but may not currently be. The rationale for strong role proximity
is that it may be desirable to base policies on roles that are not currently active. For
instance, if a military environment demands that there are no civilians present, strong
role proximity can be used to meet this demand, because it does not require users to
explicitly activate the civilian role.
Proximity Constraints
Using M = {S, T ,U , ⌧, µ,  } and the definitions above, we can now define prox-
imity constraints that can be used in a policy language. Our language is similar
to that defined in [2], except we remove the assumption of geographical proximity
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and spatial roles. The simplified grammar for a proximity constraint clause can be
written as:
C ::- C _ C
— C ^ C
— ¬C
— S Q n role unit thr
S ::- weak | strong
Q ::- at most | at least | ✏
The semantics of such a constraint dictate that satisfaction requires separate users.
That is, the semantics for the basic constraint (weak n r unit thr) dictate that there
is a set bU ✓ U such that
1. |bU | = n
2. (t, thr, unit)-wrp holds for some type t 2 types
3. 8u 2 bU r 2 Act(u)
4. 8u 62 bU r 62 Act(u)
Semantics for the strong variant would replace the last two criteria as
3. 8u 2 bU 9s 2 SU 1(u) such that r 2 SR(s)
4. 8u 62 bU 6 9s 2 SU 1(u) such that r 2 SR(s)
Semantics for the other possible constraints are straightforward variations. Note that
t is specified independently of the proximity constraint and is determined according
to the remainder of the policy. Let C denote the set of proximity constraints in this
language.5
5Observe that this syntax only supports a single realm per constraint. Intuitively, the syntax could
be extended to specify the realm and the type t within the constraint. This would allow for complex
policies that consider multiple dimensions (e.g., a policy could simultaneously have spatial, temporal,
and social constraints). As each realm would define its own distance metric  , we believe this
approach is feasible. However, we have not fully considered the implications of this approach, and
leave such composition of proximity realms for future work.
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Table 4.2.: Example policies for various realms
Geographical
Example: An o cer is allowed to read a secret file only if no civilian is present within 500m
and at least one senior o cer is present in the same room.
types = {room,meters}, O = {SecretFile},
A = {read}, R = {SeniorOfficer,Officer, Civilian}
Proximity Constraints C1 = hstrong, at most, 0, Civilian,meters, 500i,
C2 = hweak, at least, 1, SeniorOfficer, room, 0i
Proximity tuple pt = hOfficer, room,C1 ^ C2i
Policy: {pt, read, SecretFile}
Attribute
Example: A dating site member can view my profile if they have same profession and are
no more than 10 years older.
types = 2{profession,age}, O = {MyProfile}, A = {view}, R = {Member, Self}
Proximity Constraints C1 = hweak, ✏, 1, Self, {profession}, 0i,
C2 = hweak, ✏, 1, Self, {age}, 10i
Proximity tuple pt = hMember, {profession, age}, C1 ^ C2i
Policy: {pt, view,MyProfile}
Social
Example: A member of IEEE network is allowed to view my conference album only if he is
a friend of a friend or closer.
types = {individual, network, hops}, O = {ConfAlbum},
A = {view}, R = {Self, IEEEMember}
Proximity Constraints C = hstrong, ✏, 1, Self, hops, 2i
Proximity tuple pt = hIEEEMember, individual, Ci
Policy: {pt, view,ConfAlbum}
Cyber
Example: A manager can edit a shared Google document only if he is in a GoogleTalk
session with a senior manager.
types = {GoogleTalk}, O = {document1},
A = {write}, R = {Manager, SeniorManager}
Proximity Constraints C = hweak, at least, 1, SeniorManager,GoogleTalk, 0i
Proximity tuple pt = hManager,GoogleTalk, Ci
Continued on next page
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Policy: {pt, write, document1}
Temporal
Example: A supervisor can only sign an employee’s time card within 24 hours after the
employee did.
types = {hours, card signature}, O = {time card},
A = {sign}, R = {Employee, Supervisor}
Proximity Constraints C = hweak, at least, 1, Employee, hours, 24i
Proximity tuple pt = hSupervisor, card signature, Ci
Policy: {pt, sign, time card}
Proximity-based RBAC Model
We can now conclude this section with our formal definition of a proximity-based
RBAC model. Let M = {S, T ,U , ⌧, µ,  } denote a proximity model as defined pre-
viously. Policies would be based on proximity tuples pt = hr, t, ci, where c 2 C
is a proximity constraint, t 2 types is a type associated with the requesting user’s
feature, and r is the requested role. Specifically, if P denotes the set of all such tuples,
A denotes the set of actions, and O denotes the set of objects, a proximity-based
RBAC policy would be the relation Pol : P⇥A⇥O. That is, a policy specifies the
actions allowed on an object, such that the proximity constraint (which includes the
subject’s role) is satisfied. The proximity-based RBAC model   would consist
of the set of all such policies. Table 4.2 presents examples of policies for the five
proximity realms.
4.2 Enforcement Architecture
Designing a generic architecture that works across di↵erent applications and
realms is crucial but challenging task. Di↵erent types of proximity and organizational
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(a) No FM, External portal
(b) Independent FM, No communication
(c) FM direct communication
Figure 4.1. Enforcement architecture
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settings have di↵erent requirements and a single architecture may not work for all
cases. However, if an architecture is defined carefully then a major part of it can
be common and only a small portion of it may need to be changed across realms.
For instance, the method for acquiring feature mapping for a user is realm-specific.
While di↵erent application scenarios will employ di↵erent technologies, our goal in this
section is to highlight common features of principals and define required behaviors.
The purpose in defining such an abstract architecture is to establish a framework
for reasoning about the feasibility of designing and building proximity-based RBAC
systems. We propose a generic architecture and discuss changes that are required in it
to accommodate di↵erent types of feature acquisition and communication strategies.
For simplicity, we assume a centralized server with universal knowledge of the
user-feature mapping. In our current approach, we emphasize the necessity of cor-
rectly mapping each user to a feature (or a set of features) in the reference space
model. We refer to this process as feature attestation. Feature attestation could be
accomplished using cryptographic techniques, such as digitally signed proofs of loca-
tion, timestamps, or credentials. The central server serves as the Policy Information
Point (PIP) [78] and is responsible for evaluating the proximity constraints. The Pol-
icy Decision Point (PDP) uses the result of this constraint evaluation to facilitate the
proper functioning of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The main components of
our architecture are as follows.
• User : The User represents the entity that is assigned roles and initiates access
request.
• Feature management server (FMS): This server maintains the current feature
mapping of every user in the system. Given a proximity query, in which the au-
thorization server (see below) submits a proximity constraint and the requesting
user, FMS computes the proximity distances and determines if the constraint is
satisfied. It serves as the main component of the PIP and responds to queries
from the authorization server.
64
• Feature monitor (FM): This optional component is used to communicate with
the user as a means of maintaining the feature mapping. If present, this compo-
nent may issue a feature proof to the user, such as a digital certificate avowing
the claimed feature, that the user can submit as a credential along with the
request as shown in Figure 4.1(b). In an alternate architecture (Figure 4.1(c)),
FM may pervasively monitor the user and communicate with the FMS to en-
sure the user-feature mapping is updated in a timely manner. Alternatively,
this monitor may be absent entirely, in which case the user would communicate
with an external portal that pushes feature update to FMS as discussed later
(Figure 4.1(a)).
• Authorization server (AS): This serves as PDP and is responsible for evaluating
policy. It consults FMS by issuing proximity queries. Using the results of the
queries, it evaluates the remainder of the policy and determines if the request
is to be granted.
• Resource manager (RM): The resource manager serves as the PEP and is re-
sponsible for controlling access to protected resources. The resource manager
may hold the resources itself, or it may serve as a ticket-granting service.
In some cases, an external service portal, which is a trusted third party, can replace
the FM. For instance, in social proximity, the proximity-based RBAC system may
rely on an independent social network service for feature attestation. That is, the
proximity-based RBAC system consults the external social network and overlays the
feature mapping on top of the existing network. In these types of cases, the user
interacts with the service portal to make changes, and the service portal pushes these
updates to the proximity-based RBAC system. This is the architecture shown in
Figure 4.1(a).
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4.2.1 Feature Acquisition and Communication
Most of the interaction between principals is straightforward and functions like
a typical RBAC architecture that consists of users, PEP, PDP, and PIP. What is
unique about proximity-based RBAC is the acquisition and communication of feature
mapping that is achieved via the interaction between users and the PIP. Although
the precise interaction would be application specific, we identify three fundamental
approaches that are illustrated in Figure 4.1 and discussed below.
No FM, External Portal
In this approach, illustrated in Figure 4.1(a), the user explicitly interacts with an
external service portal (e.g., a social network website or a trusted third-party attribute
certification service) that is independent of the proximity-based RBAC system in
order to update his or her associated feature(s). This feature update is immediately
pushed by the external service portal to the FMS so that the FMS can correctly
evaluate proximity constraints.
For instance, in social proximity, the user makes changes to his or her profile
in a social network application, and these changes are pushed to the FMS by the
application. In temporal proximity, events are logged by some application, and the
FMS receives this data accordingly. This approach is applicable for all realms, though
the geographical realm is challenging, as users typically do not have to interact with a
centralized software portal in order to move. Instead, the other two approaches more
accurately describe approaches for geographical proximity.
Independent FM, No Communication
In this approach, users interact with a distributed set of entities (feature monitors)
that have no direct communication links to the FMS. These feature monitors provide
the user with a credential (feature proof) that asserts the correct feature mapping.
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User includes this feature proof in access request and can be validated by the FMS
as shown in Figure 4.1(b).
For instance, in geographical proximity, the user may have a Bluetooth-enabled
device that exchanges data with a receiver as the user moves. As the user moves,
the credential updates are performed locally, and only pushed to the FMS when the
user makes a request. As such, in order to enforce proximity constraints correctly,
the system must force users to push their credentials su ciently often. For instance,
in the geographic realm, doors separating rooms may be considered objects. Thus, in
order for the user to change features (i.e., move from one room to another), he must
push his credentials before the door can be unlocked.
FM Direct Communication
In this approach, a distributed sensor network (FM) continually monitors changes
to the user’s feature mapping. When the mapping changes, the sensor pushes the
updated information to the FMS accordingly (refer Figure 4.1(c)). This approach is
more appropriate for real-time geographical proximity where the location of user is
pervasively tracked. This approach is also good for temporal proximity. For instance,
the sensor may consist of a program that monitors updates to event log files and sends
updates when the file changes.
In all above communication protocols, FMS is responsible for evaluating if the
proximity constraints are satisfied. In the subsequent section, we present an algorithm
for evaluating these constraints and discuss its complexity. Further, we prove some
properties of this system and discuss its limitations.
4.3 Enforcement Protocols
In the generic architectures proposed in the previous section, the FMS serves as
PIP and evaluates the proximity constraints. We now present an algorithm (refer
Algorithm 1) that describes one approach to evaluating a single complex proximity
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constraint. Specifically, assume the constraint c 2 C consists of m primitive weak
proximity constraints, each of the form (weak n role unit thr).6 This algorithm will
evaluate each primitive constraint to yield a Boolean value to replace the constraint.
Once all constraints are evaluated, the resulting Boolean expression is evaluated.
If the return value is true, then the constraint was satisfied. Note that handling
variations allowed by the policy language involves trivial changes that do not a↵ect
the complexity of the algorithm.7
4.3.1 Complexity Analysis
Let D denote the decision problem that answers whether or not a proximity con-
straint can be satisfied. That is, assume µ maps a user to a feature in polynomial
time. Then D takes as inputM µ (i.e., the model with no current mapping of users
to features) and a policy pol 2  . D returns “yes” if there exists a mapping µ such
that the proximity constraint c 2 C in the tuple hr, t, ci for the policy pol is true. If
no such mapping exists, D returns “no.”
Lemma 4.3.1 Given a candidate mapping µ and a distance function   that run in
polynomial time, verifying µ satisfies pol can be done in polynomial time. That is, D
is in NP.
Proof Let n be the maximum of |U|, |R|, andm, wherem is the number of primitive
constraint clauses in pol. Executing Algorithm 1 without the mapping µ|t(t) can be
done in O(n3) time. ⇤
Theorem 4.3.1 D is NP-hard.
Proof Our proof is by reduction from Boolean satisfiability (SAT). Given an arbi-
trary Boolean expression, one can replace each independent variable with a unique
6For simplicity, we ignore the use of parentheses to shape the Boolean expression.
7For instance, supporting at most and at least requires adding else checks to the final if-then-else
block. These cases can be enumerated and do not vary with the size of n.
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Algorithm 1: Evaluate (weak n role unit thr) constraints
Input: c 2 C: a proximity constraint, consisting of m primitive constraints,
joined using Boolean connectives ; u 2 U : the requesting user ; t 2 T :
requesting user’s feature type
Output: true or false
/* break c into its primitive constraints */
hc1, . . . , cmi  c
Featureu  µ|{t}(u)
ActiveRoles ;
for ci := c1 to cm do
Matches 0
foreach uˆ 2 U   {u} do
/* weak proximity semantics */
foreach r 2 Act(uˆ) do
if r = ci.role then
Featureo  µ|t(uˆ)
distance  (Featureu, F eatureo, ci.unit)
if distance  ci.thr then
Matches Matches+ 1




return EvaluateBoolean hb1, . . . , bmi
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primitive proximity constraint in polynomial time. Based on the complexity of
SAT [79], D is NP-hard. ⇤
Corollary 4.3.1 Given a candidate mapping µ and a distance function   that run
in polynomial time, D is NP-complete.
Proof From Theorem 4.3.1, D is NP-hard. Under the assumption of polynomial
run time for µ and  , by Lemma 4.3.1, D is in NP. Thus, it is NP-complete. ⇤
These results illustrate a warning for building and maintaining proximity-based
RBAC systems. Clearly, the latter result shows that attempting to build an auto-
mated tool that determines if a set of policies can be evaluated would require heuristics
to be tractable. Furthermore, the complexity of Algorithm 1, while polynomial-time,
is not particularly e cient and may present scaling challenges. Thus, designers of
proximity-based systems should plan carefully to streamline the operation of the
PIP.
4.3.2 Properties of Protocols
Before describing a general approach to constructing enforcement protocols, we
first present some theoretical results that illustrate the limitations of such systems.
In real systems, communication between various components of the architecture may
entail some delay. This communication delay may lead system into a state where the
evaluation of proximity constraints at a certain time is not consistent with the cur-
rent feature mapping of users. For example, the feature mapping of a user involved
in a proximity constraint may change while the constraint is still being evaluated by
FMS. The following results use impossibility of distributed consensus [80] to show
that correct evaluation of constraints cannot be guaranteed unless FMS has correct
mapping of all users and these mapping don’t change until FMS has completed the
evaluation of proximity constraint. Theorem 4.3.2 presents the proof for the deploy-
ment scenario illustrated in Figure 4.1(a). Corollary 4.3.1 presents this proof for the
scenario in Figure 4.1(b), while the Figure 4.1(c) case is handled by Theorem 4.3.3.
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Theorem 4.3.2 Given a deployment with no feature monitor such that µ is updated
only through explicit interaction with a service portal. Correct proximity constraint
evaluation can be enforced only if access to the service portal (by the users and FMS)
is synchronous.
Proof Assume that evaluation can be enforced correctly. To prove that access
must be synchronous, we will map proximity constraint evaluation onto a consensus
protocol P . Specifically, let p1, . . . , pn denote asynchronous processes representing
users and the service portal would consist of a bu↵er for P . Each pi for a user would
respond with a 1 if the user’s feature has changed, 0 if unchanged, and b denotes
the request is still pending. The goal of P would be to have a response of 0 for
all users, indicating that the portal has the correct mapping of users to features.
However, if a single pi fails without notice (e.g., the user’s network connection gets
dropped), then no such P can exist [80]. Thus, if users are granted asynchronous
access to the service portal, no protocol involving the portal and FMS can exist
that guarantees constraint evaluation is correct. Therefore, by contradiction, correct
evaluation requires synchronous access. ⇤
Corollary 4.3.2 Given a deployment with asynchronous feature monitors, correct
proximity constraint evaluation cannot be enforced.
Proof Similar to the preceding. ⇤
The above results address the e↵ect of limitations of communication channel be-
tween users and FM/FMS on correct evaluation of proximity constraints. Inconsis-
tency in constraint evaluation may also stem from asynchronicity of communication
between the components of our architecture. That is, assuming that the channel be-
tween users and FM/FMS is synchronous and FMS has all correct mappings, it is still
not possible to achieve correct evaluation of proximity constraints. This is because by
the time the proximity evaluation decision reached RM and RM accepts/denies the
request, the feature mapping of some user may have changed in a way that it changes
71
the outcome of proximity constraint evaluation. The following theorem proves this
result.
Theorem 4.3.3 Assuming that the communication between RM, AS and FMS is
asynchronous, it is impossible for a deployment with feature monitors to guarantee
correct evaluation of proximity constraints, even if the monitors have synchronous
access to FMS.8
Proof Similar to the preceding Lemma, except the consensus protocol is now to
be executed between the principals of our architecture. That is, as communication
between RM, AS, and FMS is asynchronous, these three principals cannot achieve
consensus. Formally, let   = h 1, . . . ,  ni denote a sequence of events in the evaluation
of the constraint and the resulting data exchange. Assume FMS completes evaluation
at  i and sends the result at  i+1 to AS, who forwards the result to RM at  i+2. Letd i+2 denote the reception by FMS of a message from some FM that would change
the result of the proximity evaluation. As communication between FMS and FM is
independent from communication between AS and RM, d i+2 can occur simultaneously
as  i+2. As such, when RM grants (or denies) access at  i+3, the proximity constraint
may evaluate to a di↵erent value. Hence, the principals cannot achieve consensus,
and correct policy enforcement cannot be guaranteed. ⇤
We wish to emphasize that these impossibility results do not mean that one cannot
build a proximity-based RBAC system that functions correctly. Rather, any such
system will have brief moments when policy decisions will be incorrect. Specifically,
when a user-feature mapping changes at the same time that a related constraint is
evaluated, a race condition occurs. For instance, in geographical proximity, if a policy
that requires the presence of a supervisor is evaluated immediately after the supervisor
enters the room, it is possible that the system would have a false negative, denying
access unnecessarily, as the supervisor’s new location had not been propagated to the
8One should be careful to note that Theorems 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are not contradictory. Rather, Theo-
rem 4.3.2 disproves, in essence, the converse of 4.3.3.
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FMS yet. Thus, designers of proximity-based RBAC systems should account for such
cases.
4.3.3 Best-guess Protocols
Despite these impossibility results, system designers can achieve generally ac-
curate proximity constraint evaluation, provided one can tolerate brief moments of
erroneous results. We refer to this phenomenon as a best-guess assumption, and we
provide template protocols in the next section. The general approach is that commu-
nication proceeds as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In addition, FMS stores a cache of the
most recent proximity queries for continual re-evaluation over a designated period of
time. The frequency of the re-evaluation would be an application-specific parameter.
Within the designated time window, if the constraint evaluation changes, FMS would
forward this new information to PDP. If this result changes the policy decision, PDP
would inform the PEP, which would revoke access accordingly.
4.4 Heuristic-based Protocol Templates
Our aim in this section is to provide templates for enforcement protocols for
architectures defined in Section 4.2. We have designed these protocols to support a
number of enforcement goals, which we will formalize later. For now, our goals can
be enumerated as
• validate users’ claims for authorization to activate a role
• evaluate proximity constraints subject to a limited time frame
• minimize the amount of information leakage to prevent impersonation attacks
• prevent replay attacks by authorized users
• prevent improper accesses by unauthorized intruders
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Our protocols employ standard cryptographic primitives. Specifically, let
(Gen,Enc,Dec) denote an encryption scheme that provides indistinguishable encryp-
tions under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA-secure) such that Gen(1n) denotes a
probabilistic key generation algorithm with security parameter 1n, Enck(·) denotes
encryption using the key k while Deck(·) denotes the corresponding decryption. Next,
let (Gen, Sign, V er) denote a MAC scheme that is unforgeable against chosen mes-
sage attacks (CMA-secure)9.
We also adopt the standard convention that  denotes probabilistic assignment,
while := denotes a deterministic assignment. Finally, while we use Enc and Dec
generically, we distinguish between symmetric and public key encryption based on
the key used. For instance, EncKp refers to symmetric encryption using the key Kp
for some identifier p. Encsk(p) denotes encryption using the secret key of p, while
Decpk(p) would denote the corresponding decryption using p’s public key.
In addition to standard cryptographic primitives, our protocols employ a number
of additional building blocks, as follows. Recall that U denotes the set of users, R
the set of roles, O the set of objects, A the set of actions, S the set of features in the
reference space, P the set of proximity constraints, and Pol the set of policies. In
addition, we adopt the convention that {0, 1}n denotes a binary stream encoding some
value (such as a cryptographic certificate). Lastly, as Auth (authentication primitive
as described below) may take more than two parameters (the first is always a user,
each additional is a binary-encoded value), we use ({0, 1}n)+ to denote the function
takes one or more binary parameters.
• Auth : U⇥({0, 1}n)+ ! {true, false} – a non-interactive authentication scheme
that takes a user ID and one or more binary credentials as input, returning true
or false to indicate whether the authentication succeeds
• FindPolicies : R ⇥ O ⇥ A ! 2Pol – identifies the relevant policies for the
requested role, object, action tuple
9For simplicity of notation, we use Gen to denote the key generation scheme for both encryption
and MAC.
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• EvalTuples : (N ! 2P) ! (N ! {true, false}) – evaluates a sequence of
proximity tuples for the current feature mapping µ, returning a sequence of
truth values declaring whether or not the associated tuple was satisfied10
• Decide : 2Pol ! {true, false} – determines which policies were satisfied and
returns a Boolean indicating whether or not to grant access
• Bind : U ⇥ R ⇥ S ! {0, 1}n – a computationally binding procedure that
produces a verifiable credential (e.g., a digitally signed certificate) that ties the
user to the requested role and the claimed feature at the time requested
• GenV alidation : {0, 1}n ! ({0, 1}n ! {true, false}) – takes a digital credential
as input and returns a function that can be applied to validate the credential
at a later time
ProtocolQ0, as shown in Figure 4.2, describes the data exchanged for Figure 4.1(a).
In this architecture, the external service portal pushes updates to FMS as needed. As
this portal is considered external to our architecture, communication with it is not
modeled in Protocol Q0. Instead, Protocol Q0 shows the data exchanged when the
request is made. We use the notation poli.pt denotes the proximity tuple pt for the
given policy poli. (See Section 4.1.3.) Observe that Decide does not declare when
the decision should be made to grant access, as this is application specific. That is,
some systems may require all policies to be satisfied, while others grant access if any
policy is satisfied.
Protocol Q0 introduces several variables that may warrant additional clarification.
To start, obj 2 O denotes the object under consideration, act 2 A is the requested
action, z is a nonce, and ts denotes a timestamp. We use credfeat and credrole to
denote credentials that attest to one’s authorization to use a feature or activate a
role.
10Observe that a sequence can be modeled as a partial function from the naturals to a set of items
to be sorted. E.g., if s is a sequence, s(1) denotes the first item, s(2) the second, etc.
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Protocol Q0 – base request protocol
0) Initialization
[U ] Kr  Gen(1n)
[U ]  kr  Encpk(RM)(Kr)
[U ]  ur  EncKr (obj, act, z, ts)
[U ]  ua  Encpk(AS)(role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, z, ts)
1) Access request:
[U ! RM ]  ur, ua, kr
[RM ] Kr := Decsk(RM)( kr)
[RM ] (obj, act, z, ts) := DecKr ( ur)
[RM ]  r := Signsk(RM)(obj, act, z, ts)
[RM ]  ra  Encpk(AS)( ua, obj, act,  r)
2) Decision request:
[RM ! AS]  ra
[AS] ( ua, obj, act,  r) := Decsk(AS)( ra)
[AS] (role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, z, ts) := Decsk(AS)( ua)
[AS] validreq := Verpk(RM)({obj, act, z, ts},  r)
[AS] authid := Auth(iduser, {credrole, role})
[AS] hpol1, . . . , polmi := FindPolicies(role, obj, act)
[AS]  af := Signsk(AS)(iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, z)
[AS]  af  Encpk(FMS)(iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, credfeat, z,  af , ts)
3) Proximity query:
[AS ! FMS]  af
[FMS] (iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, credfeat, z,  af , ts) := Decsk(FMS)( af )
[FMS] validpol := Verpk(AS)({iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, z},  af )
[FMS] authfeat := Auth(iduser, credfeat)
[FMS] hres1, . . . , resmi := EvalTuples(hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti)
[FMS]  f := Signsk(FMS)(hres1, . . . , resmi, iduser, z)
4) Proximity response:
[FMS ! AS] hres1, . . . , resmi,  f
[AS] valid := Verpk(FMS)({hres1, . . . , resmi, iduser, z},  f )
[AS] res := Decide(hpol1[res1/pol1.pt], . . . , polm[resm/polm.pt]i)
[AS]  a := Signsk(AS)(res, obj, act, z)
5) Decision response:
[AS ! RM ] res,  a
[RM ] validres := Verpk(AS)({res, obj, act, z},  a)
[RM ] retval := act[obj]
[RM ]  res  EncKr (retval)
6) Approve or deny:
[RM ! U ]  res
Figure 4.2. Protocol for architecture in figure 4.1(a)
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To begin to analyze the security qualities of Protocol Q0, we can formalize the
protocol using PCL [77], as shown in Figure 4.3. In PCL notation, the protocol is re-
structured from the perspective of various roles11 that specify the behavior of various
participants within the protocol. That is, instead of looking at the global view of
the protocol, each participant’s actions are viewed in isolation. In Protocol Q0, for
instance, Init designates the initiator role. In an honest execution, the user U can
take on the role of initiator, which requires knowledge of the resource manager RM
in charge of the protected resource. Similarly, Auth is the authorization role, Pol is
the policy management role, and Eval is the proximity evaluation role.
Also, note that there is a distinction between the participant of the protocol (e.g.,
Rˆ) and the associated principal (e.g., RM). This distinction is important, as the
participant may be an adversary attempting an attack on the system. That is, Rˆ may
actually be the adversary A. As such, the PCL specification makes this distinction
obvious.
The advantage of this formalization is that it makes explicit what data is seen by
each participant in the protocol, and we can infer what knowledge is gained during
an execution R of the protocol. Figure 4.4 shows the knowledge gained by each
participant during execution. In this notation, ✓i denotes the a priori knowledge of
principal i, while  i,R denotes the knowledge gained from execution R. We use  A,R to
denote the knowledge gained by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary with
only access to the public keys of the participants. We also write  i |= ⌧ to indicate that
principal i has or knows the piece of information ⌧ . Note that  i |= ⌧ implies ⌧ 2  i[✓i
or ⌧ can be derived from some ⌧ˆ 2  i [ ✓i. For simplicity, we omit any encrypted
message  j from the  i,R sets, as our assumptions regarding encryption presume
that the knowledge gain from just an encrypted message is negligible. We also omit
verifications of MACs, as these are only relevant to determining the origin integrity
of a message, rather than providing true information about the data exchanged.
11This is an unfortunate collision of terminology. The term “role” in relation to PCL should not be
confused with the notion of RBAC role.
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Init ⌘ (Rˆ) [ Auth ⌘ (Aˆ) [
new z; receive Uˆ , Rˆ, ( ur, ua, kr);
new Kr; Kr := dec  kr, sk(RM);
 kr  enc Kr, pk(RM); (obj, act, z, ts) := dec  ur,Kr;
 ur  enc (obj, act, z, ts),Kr;  r := sign (obj, act, z, ts), sk(RM);
 ua  enc (role, iduser, credrole,  ra  enc ( ua, obj, act,  r), pk(AS);
credfeat, z, ts), pk(AS); send Rˆ, Aˆ, ra;
send Uˆ , Rˆ, ( ur, ua, kr); receive Aˆ, Rˆ, res,  a;
receive Rˆ, Uˆ , res; validres := verify ({res, obj, act, z},
res := dec  res,Kr;  a), pk(AS);
]U() retval := act[obj];
 res  enc retval,Kr;
send Rˆ, Uˆ , res;
]RM()
Pol ⌘ (Fˆ ) [
receive Rˆ, Aˆ, ra;
( ua, obj, act,  r) := dec  ra, sk(AS);
(role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, z, ts) := dec  ua, sk(AS);
validreq := verify ({obj, act, z},  r), pk(RM);
authid := Auth (iduser, {credrole, role});
hpol1, . . . , polmi := FindPolicies(role, obj, act);
 af := sign (iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, z), sk(AS);
 af  enc (iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, credfeat, z,  af , ts), pk(FMS);
send Aˆ, Fˆ , af ;
receive Fˆ , Aˆ, (hres1, . . . , resmi,  f );
valid := verify ({hres1, . . . , resmi, iduser, z},  f ), pk(FMS);
res := Decide(hpol1[res1/p1.pt], . . . , polm[resm/polm.pt]i);
 a := sign (res, obj, act, z), sk(AS);
send Aˆ, Rˆ, (res,  a);
]AS()
Eval ⌘ () [
receive Aˆ, Fˆ , af ;
(iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, credfeat, z,  af , ts) := dec( af ), sk(FMS);
validpol := verify({iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti, z},  af ), pk(AS);
authfeat := Auth(iduser, credfeat);
hres1, . . . , resmi := EvalTuples(hpol1.pt, . . . , polm.pti);
 f := sign(hres1, . . . , resmi, iduser, z), sk(FMS);
send Fˆ , Aˆ, hres1, . . . , resmi,  f ;
]FMS()
Figure 4.3. PCL specification for protocol Q0
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✓U = {obj, act, role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, ts}
✓RM = ;
✓AS = {Auth, F indPolicies}
✓FMS = {Auth, (U ⇥ S)}
 U,R = {retval, z,Kr}
 RM,R = {Kr, obj, act, z, res, retval, ts}
 AS,R = {obj, act, role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, z, ts, authid, hres1, . . . , resmi}
 FMS,R = {iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . polm.pti, credfeat, z, ts}
 A,R = {hres1, . . . resmi, res}
Figure 4.4. Knowledge gained during execution R of protocol Q0
As a final note before presenting our security analysis, our analysis focuses on
a specific adversarial model. Specifically, we assume the Dolev-Yao [81] adversarial
model, in which an adversary can eavesdrop or modify any message. Furthermore, our
analysis focuses on rational attacks. That is, we assume that RM , AS, and FMS,
participate honestly unless they could benefit from deviating. In fact, as these prin-
cipals have a vested interest in protecting the resource, we find no rational attacks
by them, with the exception of violating the desired privacy guarantees. As such,
our analysis assumes honest participation by these principals, except where noted.
Instead, we focus on attacks in which an authorized user attempts to exceed his or
her privileges (e.g., eavesdropping on another user reading a file), or external adver-
saries attempting to gain illicit access to the system. In either case, the adversary
would benefit by deviating, so we find these attacks rational and focus on them in
our analysis. Lastly, for Protocol Q0, we exclude the feature portal from our analysis
and consider it to be a trusted third party.
Lemma 4.4.1 Replay attacks by an external adversary are detectable except with
negligible probability.
Proof Assume that z is nonce that is n bits in length. Then the probability that
two users select the same z in two separate runs of the protocol is 1/2n. Furthermore,
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 ua also depends on the timestamp ts. If we let m denote the number of protocol runs
that can be initiated within ts±  , where   denotes the maximum time for which the
timestamp ts would be valid, then the probability that two randomly selected nonces
are the same would be m/2n. For moderate values of n, this probability is negligible.
Thus, by keeping a log of the most recentm nonces used, RM would detect the replay
with near certain probability.
Furthermore, even if RM fails to detect the replay, the only valid strategy for an
adversary A would be to replay the exact messages. That is, as knowledge gained by
A is  A,R 6|= iduser, credrole, credfeat, A cannot forge a message c ua for which authid
would be successful, other than the original  ua. In such a case, the e↵ect of the
replay would be contingent upon act. If act involves a modification, the replay would
simply repeat the modification. Again, though, this succeeds with only negligible
probability. However, if act is a read, the attack cannot succeed at all, as  A,R 6|= Kr.
Thus, A cannot decrypt the object and the attack fails. ⇤
Lemma 4.4.2 Tampering by an external adversary fails except with negligible prob-
ability.
Proof This property follows from the fact that (Gen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA-secure
and (Gen, Sign, V er) is CMA-secure. As such, A cannot forge b i for any of the
encrypted messages  i or b j for any of the MACs  j. Thus, any attempt at tampering
with the messages would be detected by the honest recipient. At best, A could induce
a denial-of-service by modifying, for instance, any of the resi values, causing  f to
fail verification. However, the adversary cannot forge any message that would be
accepted as legitimate, except with negligible probability. ⇤
Theorem 4.4.1 Protocol Q0 is secure under the Dolev-Yao adversarial model.
Proof Follows from the preceding two lemmas. ⇤
Lemma 4.4.3 Protocol Q0 preserves user privacy from the RM .
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Proof This follows from the fact that  RM 6|= iduser. That is, RM is able to receive
an authenticated evaluation of the proximity constraints without having to know the
identity of the requesting user. ⇤
Lemma 4.4.4 Protocol Q0 prevents replay by authorized users.
Proof The primary concern here is that a user may exploit the asynchronous, dis-
tributed nature of the protocol to exercise a right when the proximity constraint no
longer holds. However,  RM,R |= ts, ensuring RM has the ability to validate that the
timestamp claimed is reasonably accurate. Furthermore  AS,R |= ts and  FMS,R |= ts,
ensuring all principals see the same timestamp. Finally,  r is derived from ts, which
allows AS and (indirectly) FMS to validate that the timestamp matched the time
of request, as checked by RM . Thus, the timestamp and the MACs ensure that
messages exchanged match the time used to evaluate the proximity constraint. ⇤
Theorem 4.4.2 Protocol Q0 provides strong authentication of user credentials and
proximity claims.
Proof Note that a successful execution R of Q0 requires  AS,R |= authid. At the
same time,  AS,R |= authid   ✓U |= credrole. Thus, strong user authentication is
provided by the assumptions regarding the Auth primitive. Additionally,  FMS,R |=
authfeat   ✓U |= credfeat. As this credential is created by the centralized portal, which
is beyond the scope of attack by a PPT adversary A, the protocol integrates strong
proximity authentication. ⇤
Protocol Q0 is appropriate for proximity constraints defined for a centralized ap-
plication. That is, social proximity assumes the use of a social network application
with a global view. Similarly, cyber proximity is generally built on the assumption of
a centralized service, such as telephony, though peer-to-peer designs (e.g., Skype) also
exist; in the latter case, Protocol Q0 would be inappropriate. Temporal proximity can
be ensured assuming actions can be synchronized within the system. Applying Pro-
tocol Q0 for geographical proximity would be very challenging, as pervasive location
monitoring is di cult.
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Finally, note that there is a possibility for performance optimizations in certain
deployments of Protocol Q0. Specifically, if AS and FMS are hosted on the same
machine, the encryption of  af and the MAC  f are extraneous. That is, if the data
exchanged by these two principals occurs over a secure channel in which eavesdropping
is not possible, then the additional cryptographic protections are not necessary.
Figure 4.5 shows Protocol Q1, which extends the previous protocol to facilitate
communication for the architecture in Figure 4.1(b). Most of the protocol is identical,
with the exception being the generation of credfeat. In Protocol Q0, this credential is
assumed to be generated by the portal and is tangential to the protocol. In Protocol
Q1, however, the user must explicitly retrieve the credential, which binds the user to
a role and feature at a given timestamp bts. In this scenario, Bind is assumed to be a
computationally binding, perfectly hiding commitment scheme, while GenV alidation
is a non-interactive proof. For instance, the two primitives may constitute a zero-
knowledge proof-of-knowledge. The key is that U must not be able to forge such a
credential in polynomial time. The remainder of the protocol is identical, with the
exception that the proof needs to be forwarded to FMS, which verifies the credential.
The analysis of Protocol Q1 is virtually identical to Protocol Q0. Figure 4.6
shows the PCL knowledge sets for Protocol Q1. In this scenario, we are assuming
the simplest case, in which the exchange between U and FM occurs in an insecure
manner. For instance, this data may be exchanged over unencrypted Wi-Fi. Formally,
this means  A,R |= credfeat, validfeat, bts. However, the following lemmas show that
this is not a security threat. Alternatively, this point could be made moot by using
a secure channel between U and FM .
Lemma 4.4.5 Protocol Q1 remains secure against a PPT adversary under the Dolev-
Yao model.
Proof As shown in Figure 4.6,  A,R |= credfeat, validfeat, bts. However, as Bind is
assumed to be perfectly hiding,  A,R 6|= credrole. Furthermore, as Bind is computa-
tionally binding, A could not forge the credential within polynomial time, even with
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Protocol Q1 – feature monitor with no direct communication
1) [U ! FM ] iduser, role
[FM ] credfeat := Bind(iduser, role, feat)
[FM ] validfeat := GenValidation(credfeat)
2) [FM ! U ] credfeat, validfeat, bts
[U ]  uf  Encpk(FMS)(validfeat, bts)
3) [U ! RM ]  ur, ua, kr, uf
4) [RM ! AS]  ra, uf
5) [AS ! FMS]  af , uf
[FMS] (validfeat, bts) := Decsk(SMF )( uf )
6) [FMS ! AS] hres1, . . . , resmi,  f
7) [AS ! RM ] res,  a
8) [RM ! U ]  res
Figure 4.5. Protocol for architecture in figure 4.1(b)
✓U = {obj, act, role, iduser, credrole, ts}
✓RM = ;
✓AS = {Auth, F indPolicies}
✓FMS = {Auth, (U ⇥ S)}
 U,R = {retval, z,Kr, credfeat, validfeat, bts}
 RM,R = {Kr, obj, act, z, res, retval, ts}
 AS,R = {obj, act, role, iduser, credrole, credfeat, z, ts, authid, hres1, . . . , resmi}
 FMS,R = {iduser, hpol1.pt, . . . polm.pti, credfeat, validfeat, bts, z, ts}
 A,R = {hres1, . . . resmi, res, credfeat, validfeat, bts}
Figure 4.6. Knowledge gained during execution R of protocol Q1
the knowledge in  A,R. Thus, A cannot forge  ua with the stolen credential in a man-
ner that would be accepted by AS, except with negligible probability as described
previously. Therefore, the stolen credential cannot be used to create unauthorized
access. ⇤
Lemma 4.4.6 Protocol Q1 retains the privacy protection against RM as Protocol
Q0.
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Protocol Q2 – feature monitor protocol
1) [U ! FM ] iduser, role
[FM ] credfeat := Bind(user, role, feat)
[FM ] validfeat := GenValidation(credfeat)
2) [FM ! FMS] validfeat
3) [FM ! U ] credfeat
4) [U ! RM ]  ur, ua, kr
5) [RM ! AS]  ra
6) [AS ! FMS]  af
7) [FMS ! AS] hres1, . . . , resmi,  f
8) [AS ! RM ] res,  a
9) [RM ! U ]  res
Figure 4.7. Protocol for architecture in figure 4.1(c)
Proof This follows from the fact that  RM,A is identical for the two protocols. Thus,
Protocol Q1 continues to protect user privacy. ⇤
Lemma 4.4.7 Protocol Q1 continues to provide strong feature authentication for au-
thorized users.
Proof The computationally binding nature of Bind prevents forgery of credfeat by
U except with negligible probability. Thus, FMS, when validating the credential,
has probabilistic assurance that the credential has not been forged. Furthermore, as
 FMS,R |= bts, ts, FMS can determine that the request was made within an acceptable
time frame of the feature credential creation. ⇤
Finally, Figure 4.7 shows Protocol Q2, which defines an extension for the archi-
tecture in Figure 4.1(c). As in Q1, FM is responsible for issuing a computationally
binding credential. However, the binding routine in this protocol is more flexible.
That is, in Protocol Q1, validfeat must be implemented as a non-interactive tech-
nique, such as a cryptographically signed certificate. In contrast, in Protocol Q2,
FM pushes the credential validation information to FMS. For instance, FM could
84
generate a Pedersen commitment [82], sending the commitment to FMS while send-
ing the data to open the commitment to the user. Note, though, that this protocol
includes the same knowledge sets as Q1, with the exception that  U,R 6|= validfeat. As
such, the security analysis remains unchanged.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored various notions of proximity. Specifically, we have
discussed five types of proximity: geographical, attribute-based, cyber, social and
temporal. We have developed a formal model of proximity that is generic enough to
specify all these types of proximity. We have presented theoretical results illustrating
the challenges inherent in implementing a proximity-based RBAC system, and we
have also described approaches to overcome these di culties. We have presented
three generic enforcement architectures and provided protocol templates for enforcing
such systems, formalized these protocols using PCL and proved security properties
of these protocols. In summary, we argue that it is feasible to deploy a practical
proximity-based RBAC system for a variety of contextual factors.
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5 DEFENSE AGAINST CODE REUSE ATTACKS
Return Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks are an advanced form of bu↵er overflow
attacks [83] that reuse existing executable code towards malicious purposes. While
earlier exploits involved the injection of malicious code [83], the recent trend has been
to reuse executable code that already exists, primarily in the application binary and
shared libraries such as libc. These code reuse attacks can bypass traditional defenses
against code injection attacks such as W  X protection [37] that prevents execution
of arbitrary code that is injected into the memory. In a basic code reuse attack, for
instance return-into-libc attack [84,85], a bu↵er overflow corrupts the return address
to jump to a libc function, such as system. This type of attack then evolved into
a more generic ROP attack [86]. In ROP, the attacker identifies small sequences
of binary instructions, called gadgets, that end in a ret instruction. By placing a
sequence of carefully crafted return addresses on the stack, the attacker can use these
gadgets to perform arbitrary computation. These attacks continued to evolve, with
newer techniques using gadgets that end in jmp or call instructions [87].
In considering a new defensive technique, we start with two observations. First,
the main shortcoming of earlier randomization-based techniques was insu cient en-
tropy, thus making brute-force attacks feasible. Second, executable code can naturally
be broken into many function blocks that can potentially be shu✏ed. Consequently,
the amount of possible randomization generated can be significantly increased by per-
muting these code blocks within the executable. For instance, if an application has
500 function blocks, there are 500! ⇡ 23767 possible permutations of these function
blocks which significantly increases the brute force e↵ort required from an attacker.
We are not the only researchers to have investigated software diversity for ROP
attack mitigation. As discussed in section 2.3, the other approaches su↵er from one
or more of the following limitations. First, the software diversification is not done
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frequently enough. Second, some of the existing defenses require the source code or
other additional information that is not usually available. Third, the randomization is
not fine grained enough leaving large code chunks unrandomized. Fourth, significant
runtime overhead is incurred throughout the runtime of the application by introducing
additional data structures. Marlin addresses these limitations and provides a strong
and e cient defense technique against ROP attacks.
With any solution, there are always costs that must also be considered. In our
proposed scheme, there is a performance impact when the process begins. We have
evaluated the time to randomize compiled binaries on a selection of commonly used
applications and Linux coreutils, showing that the performance penalty for Marlin
is reasonable in the average case. Thus, our work demonstrates that, although Marlin
imposes certain performance costs, its success in thwarting ROP attacks makes this a
feasible approach for systems that prioritize execution integrity over optimal perfor-
mance. In section 5.2 we describe techniques for minimizing this performance impact.
For instance, performing the randomization during o✏ine pre-processing significantly
reduces the startup costs.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We start by discussing
code-reuse attacks techniques in section 5.1. In section 5.2, we describe our approach
in more detail, including optimization techniques to reduce overhead. Section 5.3
discusses the implementation details of Marlin. Section 5.4 shows the results of various
experiments that were performed to evaluate our approach. In Section 5.5, we discuss
the merits and limitations of Marlin. We then conclude in Section 5.6.
5.1 Background and Related Work
The focus of our work is on ROP attacks, which are a special case of code-reuse
attacks that leverage existing code in the application binary to execute arbitrary
instructions. In this section, we start with a brief summary of these attack techniques.
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Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of bu↵er overflow attacks. After describing the attack
techniques, we summarize critical factors of code-reuse attacks.
5.1.1 Return-oriented Programming
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is an exploit technique that has evolved from
stack-based bu↵er overflows as shown in Figure 5.1. In ROP exploits, an attacker
crafts a sequence of gadgets that are present in existing code to perform arbitrary
computation. A gadget is a small sequence of binary code that ends in a ret instruc-
tion. By carefully crafting a sequence of addresses on the software stack, an attacker
can manipulate the ret instruction semantics to jump to arbitrary addresses that
correspond to the beginning of gadgets. Doing so allows the attacker to perform ar-
bitrary computation. These techniques work in both word-aligned architectures like
RISC [88] and unaligned CISC architectures [86]. ROP techniques can be used to
create rootkits [89], can inject code into Harvard architectures [90], and have been
used to perform privilege escalation in Android [91]. Initiating a ROP attack is made
even easier by the availability of architecture-independent algorithms to automate
gadget creation [92].
While researchers were exploring defenses against return-oriented attacks, similar
techniques can manipulate other instructions, such as jmp and their variants [87, 93,
94]. While the semantics of the gadgets di↵er from ROP techniques, jump-oriented
techniques are built on the same premise: By stringing together a sequence of small
gadgets, the attacker can perform arbitrary computation without code injection. Al-
though these attacks do not require ret instructions, researchers traditionally have

























Figure 5.1. Evolution of bu↵er overflow attacks
5.1.2 Enabling Factors for Code-reuse Attacks
Based on our survey of ROP attacks and defenses, we have identified distinct
characteristics and requirements for a successful exploit. The fundamental assumption
and enabling factor for such attacks is as follows:
The relative o↵sets of instructions within the application’s code are constant. That
is, if an attacker knows any symbol’s address in the application code, then the location
of all gadgets and symbols in application’s codebase is deterministic.
We argue that a defensive technique that undermines these invariants will present
a robust protection mechanism against these threats.
5.2 Marlin Defense Technique
Code-reuse attacks make certain assumptions (as discussed in section 5.1.2) about
the address layout of application’s executable code. Marlin’s randomization technique
aims at breaking these assumptions by shu✏ing the code blocks in the binary’s .text
section with every execution of this binary. This significantly increases the di culty
89
Figure 5.2. Processing steps in Marlin
of such attacks since the attacker would need to guess the exact permutation being
used in the current process execution. This shu✏ing is performed at the granularity
of function blocks as discussed in section 5.2.2. The various steps involved in Marlin
processing are shown in Figure 5.2. Marlin is integrated into a modified bash shell
that randomizes the target application just before the control is passed over to this
application for execution. Thus, every execution of the program results in a di↵erent
process memory image as illustrated in Figure 5.3(a). Figure 5.3(b) illustrates how
shu✏ing the code results in a sequence of gadgets that is not intended by the attacker.
We now present Marlin technique in detail.
5.2.1 Attack Assumptions
We start by describing the basic assumptions for a ROP attack scenario. The
vulnerable application may have a bu↵er overflow or heap overflow vulnerability that
can be leveraged by an attacker to inject an exploit payload. The system is assumed
to be protected using write or execute only policy (W  X) and the attacker can not
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(a) Unique output with every run (b) Mitigation of ROP attack
Figure 5.3. E↵ect of function block randomization
inject arbitrary executable code in the stack or the heap. The attacker is assumed to
have access to the target binary that has not yet undergone Marlin processing. The
attacker is also assumed to be aware of the functionality of Marlin. However, the
attacker can not examine the memory dump of the running process and is unaware of
how exactly the code is randomized for the currently executing process image. Our
approach protects against both remote and local exploits as long as the attacker is
not able to examine the memory of the target process. For instance, in this threat
model, a local attacker can not attach a debugger to a process that is running as root
and obtain its memory dump.
5.2.2 Granularity of Randomization
Code can be randomized at various levels of granularity such as instruction level,
basic block level, function level, segment level or just the base address. Choosing
the right granularity of randomization is a tradeo↵ between e↵ectiveness (measure
of security o↵ered) and e ciency (measure of overhead incurred) of the the resulting
defense scheme. While randomizing at finer granularity (such as basic block or in-
struction level) provides higher entropy, it may also incur higher overhead as it breaks
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the principle of locality. That is, the basic blocks that comprise a function might be
moved to di↵erent pages and the system would have to load multiple memory pages to
execute a single function. Randomization at basic block also involves handling many
more types of jumps and calls which require precise control flow graph information.
Such precise control flow information typically cannot be completely extracted from
an executable. This makes basic block based randomization more di cult to handle
in the absence of complete control flow graph information.
On the other hand, randomization at the function level granularity eases the han-
dling of several jumps and calls. As the function body remains intact during the
shu✏ing phase, relative jumps are not a↵ected as their target lies within the same
function. Same holds true for certain computed jumps. This avoids patching the
target address for near jumps that occur within a function body. Also, by keeping
all the basic blocks of a function body together, the overhead of loading multiple
pages per function can be avoided. For these reasons, we chose to implement ran-
domization at the function level granularity in Marlin. We have shown later in the
evaluation section that even with this coarse granularity, it o↵ers strong protection
against brute force attack. We now discuss the various steps involved in application
code randomization.
5.2.3 Preprocessing Phase
As mentioned above, Marlin randomizes the application binary at the granularity
of function blocks. This requires identifying the function blocks in the application
binary. In preprocessing phase, the ELF binary is parsed to extract the function
symbols and associated information such as start address of the function and length
of the function block. However, traditional binaries are typically stripped binaries
and do not contain symbol information. In such cases, we first restore the symbol
information using an external tool, Unstrip [95]. Once the symbol information is
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restored and identified, we proceed on to the next stage of Marlin processing that
randomizes the application binary.
5.2.4 Randomization Algorithm
Once the function symbols have been identified, Marlin generates a random permu-
tation of this set of symbols. The function blocks are then shu✏ed around according
to this random permutation. Shu✏ing the function blocks in an application binary
changes the relative o↵sets between instructions that may a↵ect various jump and
call instructions. The target destination for these jumps/calls can be specified either
as an absolute address or as a relative o↵set. Relative jumps increment or decrement
the program counter by a constant value as opposed to absolute jump that directly
jump to a fixed address. When the function blocks are randomized, these jumps will
no longer point to the desired location and must be ‘fixed’ to point to the proper
locations. We achieve this by performing jump patching.
The randomization algorithm described in Algorithm 2 involves two stages. In the
first stage, the function blocks are shu✏ed according to a certain random permutation.
During this shu✏ing, we keep a record of the original address of the function and also
the new address where the function will reside after the binary has been completely
randomized. This information is stored in a jump patching table. Note that this jump
patching table is discarded before the application is given control, thus preventing
attacker from utilizing this information to de-randomize the memory layout. In the
second stage, the actual jump patching is done where the jump patching table is
examined for every jump that needs to be patched. Whenever a relative jump is
encountered, the algorithm executes PatchRelativeJump() method to redirect the
jump to the correct address in the binary. PatchRelativeJump() method takes the
current address of the jump and the address of the jump destination to determine
the new o↵set and patch the jump target. The second case is the computed jumps
where the contents of a register specify the absolute address of the destination, for
93
Algorithm 2: Code randomization algorithm
Input : Original program, P
Output: Randomized program, PR
L = All symbols in P
F = A list of forbidden symbols that should not be shu✏ed
L = L  F
OL = Ordered sequence of symbols in L
S.AddrP = Address of symbol S in program P
J.AddrP = Address of jump instruction J in program P
J.DestP = Destination address of jump J in program P
J.Sym = Symbol that J is jumping into
/* Permutation stage */
for Every symbol S 2 L do
R = Randomly select another symbol in L
Swap S and R in OL
PR = Permuted program according to symbol order in OL
/* Jump patching stage */
for Every symbol S 2 L do
for Every jump J 2 S do
if J is a relative jump to within S then
/* No action needed */
else if J is a relative jump to outside S then
J.DestPR =
J.DestP +(J.Sym.AddrPR   J.Sym.AddrP )  (S.AddrPR  S.AddrP )
PatchRelativeJump(J.AddrPR , J.DestPR)
else if J is an absolute jump then
PatchAbsoluteJump(J.AddrPR , J.DestPR)
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example call to function pointers. We handle these cases by doing a backward analysis
and fixing the instruction where the function address is being loaded into a register.
If the destination address is obtained from .data section (for example, in case of
global function pointers), then we patch the .data section with the new value. This
processing is done in PatchAbsoluteJump() method shown in Algorithm 2.
The run-time shu✏ing of the function blocks prevents multiple instances of the
same program from having the same address layout. Thus, to defeat Marlin, an
attacker would need to dynamically construct a new exploit for every instance of
every application which is not possible since the randomized layout is not accessible
to attacker. We now discuss the security guarantees o↵ered by Marlin.
5.2.5 Security Evaluation
We now show that our randomization technique significantly increases the brute
force e↵ort required to attack the system. In a brute force attack, the attacker
will randomly assume a memory layout and craft exploit payload according to that
address layout. A failed attempt will usually cause a segmentation fault due to illegal
instruction and the crashed process or thread will need to be restarted. We now
compute the average number of attempts required by an attacker to succeed. A
successful attack is assumed to be equivalent to guessing the correct permutation
used for randomization.
In the discussion that follows, let n denote the number of symbols (excluding for-
bidden symbols) in an application binary. The total number of possible permutations
that can be generated for this application is N = n!. Let P (k) denote the probability
that the attack is successful for the first time at the kth attempt. Let X be a random
variable denoting the number of brute force attempts after which the attack is suc-
cessful for the first time (that is, the attacker guesses the correct permutation). We
will now estimate the average value of X. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: A failed attempt crashes the process and causes it to be restarted.
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In this event, the process will be restarted with a new randomization. The subse-
quent brute force attempts by an attacker will be independent since he would learn
nothing from the past failed attempts. That is, the probability of success at kth at-
tempt is constant and independent of k. Let p = 1N denote the probability of success
at any attempt. Then, the average number of attempts before the attack is successful
for the first time is
E[X] = (p ⇤ 1) + (1  p) ⇤ (1 + E[X]) = 1
p
) E[X] = n!
Thus, the attacker would have to make an average n! number of attempts to correctly
guess the randomized layout and launch a successful ROP attack.
Case 2: A failed attempt crashes a thread of the process and causes only that
thread to be restarted.
In this event, since the process is still executing, the memory layout will remain
same. Every failed attempt will eliminate one permutation. The probability that first
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So, the attacker will need an average n!2 number of brute attempts to correctly
guess the randomization and launch successful ROP attack. Given enough time and
resources, the attacker can try all possible permutations one after the other and will
require at most n! attempts for a successful brute force attack.
As an example, to launch a successful ROP attack against an application with 500
symbols that is protected using Marlin, an average 500! = 23767 number of attempts
96
will be required for the first case. This is clearly computationally infeasible. A more
extensive evaluation performed using coreutils applications is presented later in
Section 5.4 that demonstrates the e↵ectiveness of our technique.
5.2.6 Discussion
Having described our randomization techniques above, it is necessary to o↵er a
few words about how Marlin applies them while addressing specific implementation
challenges that have been identified [4] in regard to memory image randomization.
Against ROP attacks, randomization is, by far, the more e↵ective technique. By
significantly increasing the entropy of the application image, randomization creates
negligible probability that an adversary can craft a chain of gadgets for short-lived ap-
plications, as every new process will have a di↵erent configuration of function blocks.
Specifically, the large number of possible permutations significantly increases the
number of attempts needed for a single ROP gadget chain to work.
Shacham et al. [4] correctly point out that full randomization eliminates sharing
memory pages between processes. For strong security guarantees, eliminating sharing
is actually desirable. That is, for some critical applications, it is more important to
guarantee integrity than optimal performance. However, in other cases, such strong
security guarantees are not required. To accommodate a wide range of trade-o↵s,
several approaches are possible. First, an executable could be marked as critical,
which would then be fully randomized. Next, normal applications would first detect
if another instance of the same executable is already running. If so, the new pro-
cess would share read-only access to the shu✏ed code image. Such options can be
implemented using flags that get passed to Marlin.
5.2.7 Optimization Techniques
A straightforward performance optimization for Marlin would be to perform the
pre-processing for jump patching only once for each application and store the result
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in a database maintained by the system. The jump patching algorithm can reuse the
information about function blocks from this database in subsequent executions. The
database would only need to be updated when the application code changes.
The impact of the code randomization can be reduced by taking the permutation
generation o↵-line. To do so, each application will have a dedicated file containing
the next instance’s permutation. When a binary is executed, the custom shell sends
a signal to a trusted daemon process that runs with low priority and returns the next
permutation. The application’s function blocks are then shu✏ed accordingly.
5.3 Implementation Details
We have implemented a Marlin prototype that can operate on any ELF binary
without requiring its source code. The implementation was done for 32-bit x86 ar-
chitecture on a system running Ubuntu operating system. Implementation of Marlin
involved two major components. First part consisted of randomizing the executable
code and generating the randomized binary. The second part dealt with integrating
this into an existing system such that binary randomization occurs seamlessly with
every execution. We discuss the details of Marlin implementation below.
5.3.1 Code Randomization
Randomizing an application’s executable code segment consists of two stages.
First is the preprocessing stage that can be done just once per binary and is inde-
pendent of subsequent executions. This stage involves disassembling a binary and
extracting information about the function blocks and also the control flow. The sec-
ond stage is the actual randomization stage when the function blocks are shu✏ed and
the jump/call targets are patched. We now discuss each of this in further detail.
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Preprocessing Stage
Before we randomize the binary, we need to identify the function blocks. We do
this by disassembling the binary using objdump disassembler and then parsing the
dissembler output to extract the function symbols and the relevant information. For
each function symbol, we gather information about its location in the executable, the
length of the function block and the information on any jumps or calls originating
from this function. This information is collected for functions in the PLT table as
well in addition to the application defined functions.
While we use objdump disassembler, other commercial options such as IDAPro
can be used to obtain more accurate disassembly. Also, several production level bina-
ries are available only as stripped binaries, that is the symbol information has been
removed from them. We restore the symbol information using Unstrip utility [95]
before disassembling it using objdump.
Randomization Stage
In this stage, the actual shu✏ing of the function blocks is performed. The first
step is to generate a random permutation of symbols and shu✏e the list of symbols
to obtain a new order of symbols. The new binary is re-written according to this
new symbol order. In our preliminary implementation [96], we did not shu✏e certain
symbols such as start that were referred to as forbidden symbols. Our revised im-
plementation no longer has this limitation and all the symbols within .text section
are now randomized, including start symbol. This start symbol is the first in-
struction that executes after the binary is loaded into the memory by the ELF loader.
This entry address is stored in ELF header of the binary. Once the application is
randomized, we patch the ELF header with the new entry address which is the new
location of start symbol.
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Fixing Jumps and Calls
The jump and call patching is performed in the same pass when the new ran-
domized binary is written. This is done by using the patch list information that is
generated during the preprocessing stage. For each call that needs to be patched,
the patch information consists of the name of the parent symbol, the name of symbol
being patched to and the o↵set from the beginning of the parent symbol where the
patching needs to be done.
The calls and jumps can be of the following types:
• Call instructions
– Call to an application defined function: In normal function calls (call <
f1 >), the target address of the callee function is specified as relative
address o↵set from the address of the call instruction. We fix this target
address in the call patching phase using the patch information collected
during the preprocessing phase.
– Call to a dynamically linked function: Functions in dynamically linked
libraries that are called in the application’s code appear in the PLT section
of the application’s code. Calls to these linked functions (call < f2@plt >)
are also specified as relative o↵set from the address of the call instruction to
the function’s PLT entry. These targets are also fixed in the call patching
stage by correcting the relative o↵set.
– Call to a function pointer: Call to function pointers are handled as indirect
calls, that is the absolute address of call target is loaded into a register, say
%eax, and then the call is made as call ⇤%eax. To fix these types of calls,
the absolute address of the callee should be patched at the instruction that
loads its address into the %eax register. This is done by doing a backward
analysis starting from an indirect call instruction and tracing backwards
until we reach the instruction where the value of function pointer is loaded.
In case of global function pointers, the address of function is stored in the
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data section and eventually loaded from this data section into a register. In
these cases, the data section is patched with the corrected function address
after shu✏ing.
• Jump Instructions: In x86 architecture, jumps can be either conditional jumps
or unconditional jumps. Conditional jumps are near jumps while unconditional
jumps can be either near or far jumps. We don’t need to patch the near jumps as
they are within the same function body and specified using the function o↵set.
However, unconditional far jumps transfer program control to the target address
without a return. For example, this can happen in the case of goto statement
where the jump specifies an absolute address . If the jump destination is outside
the application’s code, for example a shared library, then this does not need
patching. However, if the destination of a far jump is within the application
code, then this will need to be patched. We patch certain far jumps, for instance
the jump tables that are created due to some switch-case blocks. These jump
tables are stored in .rodata section of the code. We patch the jump table in
this .rodata with the new jump targets after randomizing the code.
5.3.2 System Integration
Software diversification can be applied at various stages in an application’s lifecycle
ranging from compile-time diversification to runtime-diversification. In Marlin, our
goal is to randomize the target binary with each execution. That is, we want to
invoke the Marlin functionality whenever the target binary is executed. We considered
several approaches to achieve this as discussed below.
First approach that we considered was modifying the dynamic loader (ld). In
this approach, the application code that is mapped in the memory by mmap call will
be randomized just before the control is passed to the target binary. This has the
advantage that all the transformations are done in the memory and they are done
immediately before the control flow jumps to application’s start symbol. This en-
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sures that every application is randomized with each execution and no intermediate
files are generated that can be potentially exploited by the attacker. However, this
approach incurs several complications and redundant processing. For example, the
loader library (ld-linux.so) is self contained and does not use any shared library
which makes it di cult to integrate Marlin’s code into the loader. More importantly,
the work that the loader has done to load the normal application code (resolving
references etc) is wasted e↵ort since the functionality needs to be re-executed af-
ter randomizing the code again. For these reasons, we decided against using this
approach.
The second approach that we considered was modifying the execve system call
such that it first executes Marlin to randomize the target executable and then executes
the randomized code. However, since execve is used by almost every execution in
the system including the kernel code, modifying this function can introduce a lot
of instability into the system, especially during the testing phase. Also, to prevent
the recursive invocations of Marlin onto itself, one would need to modify the execve
definition which is not a good solution since execve is called at several places in both
user and kernel code. Thus, we decided against using this approach as well.
Finally, the third approach that we considered was a custom secure shell approach.
In this approach, we modified the normal shell code to create a secure shell that would
randomize the target binary before executing it. This is the approach that we adopted
in implementing the Marlin prototype. We modified the source code for bash shell,
specifically the shell execve function that is responsible for making a call to execve
method. We created a hook just before the execve call to randomize the code for the
target binary. This approach has the advantage that it allows us to test our system
without interfering with the existing system functionality. In the deployment of the
production version, one can easily replace the normal bash shell with our secure shell
to ensure that all the executions invoked by this shell are randomized.
Further, we implemented a whitelist that allows for selectively randomizing only
certain application binaries. For example, one may wish to randomize only those
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applications that have user interaction, that is they accept input from a user (can
be a remote user). Our implementation supports specifying the whitelist entries in
three di↵erent ways. First, the entry can be an absolute path of a directory in which
case all the files contained in this directory and its sub-folders will be randomized.
Second, the entry can be specified as the absolute path of an application in which
case this application is randomized whenever it is executed using secure shell. Finally,
the entry can be specified just using the name of the executable in which case any
executable with the specified name, irrespective of its path, will be randomized before
execution. This whitelist is protected and can only be modified by the superuser.
5.4 Evaluation
We now describe various experiments that were performed to evaluate Marlin
technique. These experiments test the e↵ectiveness of Marlin technique and also
the performance overhead incurred due to randomization. The experiments were
performed on a Linux virtual machine with 2 processor cores and 4GB RAM (host
machine processor was Intel Core i5 2.4GHz with 6GB RAM). This VM had ASLR
andW  X protection enabled while the experiments were being performed. We used
coreutils binaries, some commonly used application binaries (see Table 5.1) and
byte-unixbench [97] benchmarks to conduct various experiments. To launch attacks
against Marlin-protected binary, we use ROPgadget (v3.3.3) [98], an attack tool that
automatically creates exploit payload for ROP attacks by searching for gadgets in an
application’s executable section.
5.4.1 E↵ectiveness
First, we tested the e↵ectiveness of Marlin using a test application that has a
bu↵er overflow vulnerability. This application, ndh rop, was included as a part of the
ROPgadget test binaries. We used ROPgadget on this target application and found
162 unique gadgets. These were su cient to craft a shell code exploit payload. When
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this exploit payload was provided as an input to the unprotected binary, it gave us
a shell. Next, we randomized this application using Marlin technique and tried to
attack it using the same input payload. The attack did not succeed and failed to
provide us with a shell.
This highlights the sensitivity of these attacks to slight changes in the address lay-
out. ROP attacks operate under the strong assumption of a static address layout of
executable code. In our threat model, the attacker only has access to the unprotected
binary and is not aware of the exact permutation that has been used for randomiza-
tion. So he can only run ROPgadget tool on the unprotected test application.
Brute Force E↵ort
In section 5.2.5, we computed the average number of attempts required to suc-
cessfully attack a randomized binary. This brute force e↵ort is approximately n!
where n is the number of symbols in a binary. We performed an extensive evaluation
of this using 131 ELF binaries corresponding to 105 coreutils applications and 26
commonly used applications. Figure 5.4 shows the CDF of number of symbols present
in these applications. We noticed that around 97.7% of these applications have more
than 80 symbols (indicating an e↵ort of 80! attempts). We observed an average of
470 symbols and a median of 130 symbols present in these applications. Thus, the
number of brute force attempts in a general case can be approximated to 130! ⇡ 2730
attempts which is quite significant. Also, on an average, we observed the time to
compute one attack payload is 15.48 seconds.
It is interesting to note that the e↵ectiveness of protection o↵ered by Marlin de-
pends on the modularity of the program. An application that has several function
modules will be more secure against brute force attempts when protected with Mar-
lin. If the entire code of an application is organized in few functions, then irrespective
of the size of the binary, it will still be quite susceptible to brute force attacks since
it would contain large chunks of unrandomized code. Randomizing at finer granu-
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Figure 5.4. CDF for number of symbols
larity, for example at the granularity of basic blocks or instructions, will solve this
issue. However, we believe that randomization breaks the locality principle and the
randomized binary may su↵er a performance hit. Thus, as a trade o↵, we chose to
randomize at the granularity of function block.
Gadget Displacement
Next, we studied the entropy introduced by our randomization approach by mea-
suring the gadget displacement. That is, we measured how many gadgets are moved
due to randomization by Marlin technique. To measure this, we extend the ROPgad-
get tool to compare the original binary with the randomized binary and compute the
number of unique gadgets that were found in former and are no longer present at the
same address in latter. This experiment was also performed on the same set of 131
application binaries as used in section 5.4.1 with 20 iterations per binary.
We measure two types of gadget displacement. First, we measure the displacement
of unique gadgets that are found by ROPgadget in the executable sections of the target
binary. Note that these gadgets are not necessarily from .text section and may belong
to other executable sections such as .plt section. In this case, we observed an average
of 71.8% and a median of 72.5% gadgets were displaced in the randomized binaries.
Since we randomize only .text section, the gadgets found in other executable sections
were unmoved. Next, we restricted the search for unique gadgets to only .text section
and measured the number of gadgets that were displaced by randomization. In this
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case we observed an average of 99.78% gadget displacement (with median as 100%
displacement). Thus, nearly all gadgets in the .text section are displaced.
We can conclude from above observations that randomizing at function level gran-
ularity leads to high gadget displacement which is quite e↵ective against ROP attacks.
This eliminates the need for randomizing at a more finer granularity such as basic
blocks or instruction level.
5.4.2 Overhead Analysis
We evaluated the e ciency of Marlin by measuring two variables. First, we mea-
sured the processing cost incurred by Marlin while loading an application as discussed
in section 5.4.2. Second, we measured the runtime overhead of the randomized bina-
ries. This is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2.
Marlin Processing Overhead
When an application is loaded, Marlin identifies the function blocks and records
information about them (such as start address, length) that is used later in jump
patching. This computation is independent of the individual randomizations. Next
phase involves shu✏ing the function blocks and patching the jumps. Marlin processing
cost is the combined overhead of these two phases. We measure Marlin processing
overhead for the same set of 131 ELF binaries used in above experiments with 20
randomizations per binary.
Figure 5.5 shows the CDF of processing cost for Marlin for these 131 applications.
We notice that 95% of these applications incurred less than 1.43 seconds processing
time. This is quite reasonable since this is a one time overhead incurred only at the
application load time. We observed that applications with larger number of symbols
incur more processing overhead. For instance, the application gimp took significantly
longer time to process (8.13 seconds). This is because it contained 10760 symbols in
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Figure 5.5. CDF for Marlin processing time
contrast to a median of 130 symbols by other applications. The average time taken
by Marlin processing was 0.87 seconds with a median of 0.53 seconds.
Thus, we observe that the processing overhead due to Marlin is very minimal.
Also, the performance hit is incurred only at the load time of the application. Once
the application binary has been randomized, it executes like a normal application
binary.
Runtime Overhead
We measured the runtime overhead of randomized binaries to see if shu✏ing the
functions a↵ects the execution time of a binary. For this purpose we use the byte-
unixbench benchmarks. We used the execution time of un-randomized benchmarks as
a baseline to compare with randomized benchmarks. We performed 20 randomizations
per benchmark and took the average of these values. We observed that the execution
time of the benchmarks was same before and after randomization and was not a↵ected
due to Marlin. This supports our initial hypothesis that the overhead is incurred only
during the randomization phase of Marlin and after that the binary executes as a
normal binary with no runtime overhead.
5.4.3 Comparison with Existing Defense Techniques
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 compare Marlin with other approaches with respect to the
defense techniques, the properties, and the metrics. We compared these approaches
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based on nine comparison dimensions. First, we looked at the types of code reuse
attacks mitigated by these techniques. Marlin defends against both return-based and
jump-based attacks, unlike [50,61] that can stop only return-based attacks. Next we
look at the techniques adopted by these defense approaches. These techniques employ
either some form of diversification or use execution monitoring. For diversification
based approaches that use code randomization, the randomization can be performed
at various granularities. While randomizing at finer granularity such as instruction
level [40, 43] increases entropy, it decreases the runtime performance by breaking
memory locality. Control flow integrity [58,60] and other approaches [50,52,61] that
monitor runtime execution also incur significant runtime overhead. Marlin adopts a
tradeo↵ approach by using a coarse-granularity of randomization that achieves high
entropy with no runtime overhead.
These defense techniques can be applied at di↵erent stage of software cycle such as
installation, loading, execution stage etc. Marlin is applied at application load time
which provides the advantage of frequent randomization without a↵ecting runtime
performance. Techniques such as [40,50,52,58,60,61] that are deployed at execution
stage incur a runtime overhead as shown in column 4 (in Table 5.2) and column 3 (in
Table 5.3). Techniques that use runtime data structures also incur memory overhead
in addition to runtime overhead. As shown in column 6 (in Table 5.3), [40,50,52] use
runtime data structure, while Marlin technique does not require any such additional





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These overheads for other approaches are indicated in columns 3 and 4 in Ta-
ble 5.3. Some of the defense approaches such as [43, 50] use binary instrumentation
to integrate their technique and this results in a increase in file size (see column 4 in
Table 5.3). Marlin does not use any instrumentation and does not incur any space
overhead.
We also compared Marlin with other approaches based on gadget displacement
which measures how many gadgets are displaced in the target binary after apply-
ing diversification techniques. This metric is not applicable for techniques such as
[50,52,58,61] that do not diversify the binary, hence the gadget displacement is zero.
Marlin displaces 99.78% of the gadgets in .text section by using function level ran-
domization. Thus, we show that the coarse granularity randomization is su cient
and finer granularity randomization such as instruction level or basic block level ran-
domization does not o↵er any additional benefits and in some cases may lead to
unnecessary overheads.
5.5 Discussion
Our proposed solution to defend against code-reuse attacks was to increase the
entropy by randomizing the function blocks. One may apply this randomization
technique at various levels of granularity - function level, block level or gadget level.
The level of granularity to choose is a trade o↵ between security and performance. In
our implementation, we implemented the randomization at the function level which is
the most coarse granularity amongst the three mentioned above. However, we show
that even this coarse level of granularity provides substantial randomization to make
brute force attacks infeasible.
Our prototype implementation requires the binary disassembly to contain symbol
information, i.e. a non-stripped binary. In practice however, binaries may be stripped
and not contain the symbol information. We address this by using external tools
such as Unstrip [95] that restore symbol information to a stripped binary. Another
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approach to process stripped binaries is to randomize at the level of basic blocks
since they don’t require function symbols to be identified. However, randomizing at
basic block granularity will likely incur higher runtime overhead as it would break
the principle of locality.
One limitation of Marlin is that it is unable to correctly rewrite certain binaries
if these target binaries have certain compiler optimizations enabled or if they are
obfuscated. This is because Marlin requires the .text section in the target binary to
be organized as function blocks and for these function block to be clearly identifiable
using a disassembler.
5.6 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a fine-grained randomization based approach to defend
against code reuse attacks. This approach randomizes the application binary with
a di↵erent randomization for every run. We have implemented a prototype of our
approach and demonstrated that it is successful in defeating real ROP attacks crafted
using automated attack tools. We have integrated this into a custom bash shell that
randomizes a binary before executing it. We have also evaluated the e↵ectiveness
of our approach and showed that the brute force e↵ort to attack Marlin is signifi-
cantly high. Based on the results of our analysis and implementation, we argue that
fine-grained randomization is both feasible and practical as a defense against these
pernicious code-reuse based attack techniques.
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6 RUNTIME DETECTION AND RESPONSE AGAINST CODE REUSE
ATTACKS
While several defense techniques have been proposed to detect and/or prevent ROP
attacks, they fail to provide a complete defense system that also diagnoses and re-
sponds to these attacks in real time. Attack diagnosis is a critical part of a defense
framework as it provides useful information for deploying response and preventive
measures. We propose ROPShield, a defense framework that integrates detection,
diagnosis and response against ROP attacks. The detection component uses a run-
time monitoring mechanism to continuously verify execution constraints and raise an
alarm if these constraints are violated. Based on the execution constraints that are
violated, ROPShield diagnoses the type of attack and generates a report containing
fine-grained diagnosis information. This diagnosis report is then leveraged by the re-
sponse component to deploy appropriate response action such as generating a patch
for bu↵er overflow. We evaluated ROPShield prototype using nine code reuse exploits
collected from various sources and found it to be e↵ective in defending against these
exploits.
While attack detection or prevention techniques are e↵ective against ROP attacks,
they are not without their limitations. Firstly, they provide little or no diagnostic
information about the attack. In absence of diagnostic information, very limited re-
sponse actions, such as, shutdown processes, can be executed. Second, in the event
of an attack, most of these techniques, such as [4, 42, 43, 96], either crash or halt
the current process. The crash reports then need to be analyzed by system admin-
istrators and responses are applied manually. This may introduce significant delays
in deployment of responses and the integrity of the system might have already been
compromised by that time. Also, human errors such as oversight of some data may
reduce credibility of the diagnosis.
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A strong defense framework against ROP attacks must thus integrate compo-
nents for detection, diagnosis as well as response against these attacks. The main
contributions of this work are as follows.
• We propose a complete defense framework, ROPShield, for detection, diagnosis
and response against ROP attacks.
• We present a novel detection technique for ROP attacks that is based on evalu-
ating certain execution constraints instead of the complete control flow graph.
• We demonstrate how the diagnosis information generated by ROPShield can be
integrated into response mechanisms.
• We present a prototype implementation of ROPShield for 32-bit x86 architec-
ture.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents a high level overview of
the ROPShield framework. Section 6.2 discusses the detection and diagnosis compo-
nent of ROPShield. Next, we present the details of response component in section 6.3.
Section 6.4 discusses the details of the prototype implementation and presents the
evaluation of our approach. Finally, we discuss limitations and advantages of our
approach and conclude in section 6.5.
6.1 System Overview
Figure 6.1 shows a high level view of ROPShield and of the interactions between
its components. The first component is the detection and diagnosis component that
is responsible for detecting ROP attacks. It uses run-time tracing to monitor the
execution of the target application and detect illegal execution. In addition to ROP
attacks, ROPShield can also detect some other similar attacks such as return to libc
and code injection (using stack smashing). A configuration file is used to specify




























Figure 6.1. System overview
stop all supported types of attacks. ROPShield not only detects an attack, but it also
identifies the type of attack based on the execution constraints that are violated. Once
an attack is detected, ROPShield generates an attack diagnosis report and invokes
the response mechanism. This diagnosis report contains more information about the
attack such as the type of attack, and the vulnerable function, and serves as an
input to the response component. The response component computes the response
according to a set of predefined response rules and deploys the response actions.
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<config>
  <attack id="CODE_INJECTION">
    <response id="KILL_PROCESS"
              mode="AUTOMATIC" >
    </response>
    <response id="ENABLE_W_XOR_X"
              mode="AUTOMATIC" >
    </response>
  </attack>
  <attack id="ROP">
    <response id="KILL PROCESS"
              mode="AUTOMATIC" >
    </response>
    <response id="PATCH_BUFFER"
              mode="AUTOMATIC" >
    </response>
    <response id="ENABLE_CODE_RANDOMIZATION
              mode="MANUAL" >
    </response>
  </attack>
</config>
Figure 6.2. Example of configuration file
Attack Definition File
This file specifies the attacks that are supported by ROPShield. These attacks are
described in terms of various execution constraints as explained later in section 6.2.2.
The current implementation supports code injection attacks, that use stack smashing,
return to libc and ROP attacks. The attack definition file is write protected to prevent
unauthorized modification and can only be modified by the root user. The DTD for
this XML file is specified below.
<!ELEMENT attackdefs (attack)*>





This file configures the operation of ROPShield according to the specific target
application. This is required because di↵erent applications may have di↵erent security
requirements and would need to respond di↵erently in the event of an attack. If two
or more applications have similar security requirements, then they can use the same
configuration file. The configuration file to be used with the target application is
specified as an input argument to ROPShield while invoking this application. If no
configuration file is specified, then ROPShield uses the default configuration file.
The configuration file specifies the following information:
• The type of control flow hijacking attacks to check for a given target application.
By default, all supported attacks are checked by ROPShield.
• The response to deploy for each type of attack. The default response action is
to shutdown the target application when an attack is detected.
• The mode of response deployment. This can be either manual or automatic. In
manual mode, the response is manually deployed by the system administrator,
where as in automatic mode the response is deployed automatically without any
human intervention.










An example of configuration file is shown in Figure 6.2. This specifies that ROP-
Shield should check for code injection and ROP attacks while monitoring the target
application. If a code injection attack is detected, then the response deployed ac-
cording to this configuration file would be to first kill the process and then enable
W  X protection. If ROP attack is detected, then the responses deployed automat-
ically would be to kill the process and patch the bu↵er overflow. The response action
ENABLE CODE RANDOMIZATION is marked as manual indicating that some interaction
on behalf of the security administration, such as confirm action, may be required to
deploy this response action.
Tracer
This component is responsible for monitoring the target process at run-time. The
tracer is attached to the target process and monitors its execution at a very fine
granularity, that is, at instruction level. It continuously feeds the trace information
to the attack detection logic for verifying the execution constraints.
Attack Detection Logic
This is the algorithm that detects and identifies control hijacking by verifying
execution constraints at every step of the target process’ execution. The execution
constraints to be evaluated are derived from the attack definition file and the attacks
specified in the configuration file. The intuition and details of this detection logic are
discussed in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
Diagnosis Report
If an attack is detected by the attack detection logic, then a diagnosis report
is generated. This diagnosis report contains information about the type of attack
detected, the vulnerable function, and other process state information at the time
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of attack detection. This diagnosis information can then be used by the response
component to compute and deploy the response. An example of diagnosis report
generated for a ROP attack is shown later in Figure 6.4.
Response Definition File
This file contains a list of responses that are supported by ROPShield. Each
response is specified as a 3-tuple that consists of a response identifier, the command to
be executed as response action, and the arguments to be passed to this command. The
response identifier uniquely identifies a response action and is used in the configuration
file to indicate the response to be deployed for a given attack.
Response Computation Logic and Deployment
If an attack is detected, the response computation logic identifies the appropriate
response identifiers according to the configuration file. Once the appropriate response
has been computed, it needs to be deployed. The response actions to be invoked are
identified from the response definition file using the response identifiers. If the config-
uration file has specified automatic deployment, then the response action command
is invoked immediately. However, if the deployment mode has been marked manual,
an alarm is raised and the security administrator is notified.
ROPShield is designed as an extensible framework, that is, it can be extended to
include additional types of attacks and response.
6.2 Attack Detection and Diagnosis
We now discuss the attack detection logic in further detail. We start by providing
the basic intuition behind our detection algorithm and then delve deeper into the
details of detection logic and attack diagnosis.
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6.2.1 Basic Intuition
The basic intuition behind our detection logic is that the control flow of a normal
execution di↵ers from the control flow of a subverted program where the latter violates
certain execution constraints. For example, consider a ROP attack. ROP attack logic
works by chaining together multiple gadgets to achieve the desired functionality. Our
detection technique for ROP attacks is based on the following key observations. First,
the gadgets required for an exploit payload are often scattered across di↵erent function
blocks. This causes the attack execution to jump across multiple function boundaries.
Second, a unique combination of instructions identify the prologue and epilogue of
a function. This limits the number of gadgets that can appear in the beginning of
a function which leads to our next observation. Third, most of the gadgets required
in an exploit payload do not start at the entry point of a function. That is, the
control flow from a compromised stack jumps to some instruction in the middle of
an arbitrary function instead of the start of callee function or return address in the
caller function (See Figure 6.3).
The key takeaway from these observations is that the control flow for a ROP
execution di↵ers from a normal execution in that it violates certain execution con-
straints. In a normal execution, when a function is called, a frame is allocated on
the stack that stores the local data of the function. This stack frame represents the
execution context of the function. The current instruction that is being executed in
a process must belong to the function which has its frame on the top of the stack.
In a ROP execution, the compromised stack contains a series of return addresses
that point to instructions (or unintended instructions) in the middle of an arbitrary
function. When these gadgets are executed, they do not have their own context on
the stack and they are executed from a di↵erent function’s stack frame rather than
from their own. So, if the system starts executing instructions that do not belong
to the current function context, this generally indicates that an illegal execution is

























 mov  %esp, %ebp
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Figure 6.3. Di↵erence in control flow between a normal execution and
a ROP execution
some small functions do not establish a frame on stack. Such functions are identified
during preprocessing stage and handled as a special case by our technique.
6.2.2 Detection Algorithm
We leverage the previous observations to develop a detection technique that can
detect ROP attacks in real time. This technique uses a process tracing based approach




The first step is the preprocessing step that is used to identify the functions and
related information in the target binary. In this step, the target binary is disassembled
using a disassembler such as objdump. The output of the dissembler is then parsed
to identify the function blocks and their bounds, that is, the start and end addresses.
This information is used to associate the current instruction with its corresponding
function. During the preprocessing step, we also identify those functions that do not
set up a stack frame. This information is useful in detection logic to avoid incorrect
detection.
Process Monitoring
The next step is tracing where the target process is traced and monitored by our
detection system. The tracing functionality is achieved by using the ptrace call to
trace the target process at instruction level granularity. We single step through each
instruction and examine various variables such as current instruction pointer (%eip),
current stack pointer (%esp) and the instruction being executed. We also maintain a
stack of functions that correspond to the function frames currently on the stack. For
each instruction that is about to be executed, we identify the function to which it
belongs using the function bounds information gathered during preprocessing phase.
A change in function context can be identified by checking if this function does not
correspond to the function frame on the top of the stack.
Our detection logic evaluates certain execution constraints before each instruction
execution to detect ROP attacks. These constraints are based on identifying illegal
jumps during the process execution. The execution constraint violations that are
checked by ROPShield are as follows.
C1 Execute from Stack: This check aims at detecting code injection attacks
where the shell code is injected on the stack and the control flow is transferred
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to it. Note that this constraint is relevant only for code injection attacks and
not for ROP attacks which are code reuse attacks.
C2 Return to Middle: This checks for illegal control transfer where the callee
function returns to the middle of a function that is not the caller function. This
is a common behavior in ROP attacks.
C3 Return to Start: This checks for illegal control transfer where a function
returns to the start of a function. Control transfer to beginning of a function
is legal only when the preceding instruction is a jump or call to this function.
This constraint is useful in detecting ROP as well as return to libc attacks.
The evaluation for constraints C2 and C3 is done only when a change of function
context is detected. We assume that the jumps that occur within the boundaries of a
function are legal. While this may not always be true, it is a reasonable assumption
for detecting meaningful attacks since the gadgets required to craft a shell code exploit
are usually not present entirely within a single function body and are typically spread
across di↵erent functions.
When the next instruction to be executed belongs to a function di↵erent from the
current function context on stack, we check if this is an illegal context change. A
legal change of function context occurs due to one of the two reasons:
1. The callee function has finished the execution and has returned. The top of the
stack will now contain the stack frame for the caller function.
2. The current function has made a function call that pushes the stack frame for
the callee function on the top of the stack and change the current function
context to the callee function.
In bu↵er overflow based control hijacking, the attacker exploits the first case by
overwriting the return address to return to somewhere else instead of to the caller.
This unintended control flow is detected as follows. ROPShield checks if the current
instruction belongs to the middle of a function or the beginning of a function. If the
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former is true and this function is not the caller function (constraint C2), then this
is flagged as illegal execution. If the instruction belongs to the start of a function
and the previous instruction was not a call or jump to this function (constraint C3),
then this is also flagged as illegal execution. In all other cases, the function context
change is passed as legal and the execution is allowed to continue to the next instruc-
tion. However, if an illegal execution is flagged, an alarm is raised and the response
mechanism is deployed.
As the process tracing and detection is done in real time, our approach is e↵ective
in stopping a ROP attack before it can achieve privilege escalation. A typical shell
code exploit requires multiple gadgets to construct the attack logic. All of the required
gadgets are unlikely to exist in a single function and are usually spread out over
multiple functions. Thus, to execute the attack logic, instructions from multiple
functions must be executed from within the stack frame of the function that has
the vulnerable bu↵er. This violates the execution constraint that is checked by our
algorithm and our detection scheme is able to stop the ROP attack before it can
achieve privilege escalation.
6.2.3 Attack Diagnosis
In addition to detecting the attack, ROPShield also identifies the type of attack
based on the execution constraints that were violated. The current design supports
three types of attacks as discussed below. ROPShield can be extended to support
more types of control hijacking attacks by identifying the relevant execution con-
straints violated by an attack and adding this information to the attack definition
file.
Attacks identified by ROPShield’s diagnosis component are:
1. ROP attacks: These attacks are code reuse attacks that subvert the control
flow by overwriting the return address and jump to multiple arbitrary locations
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to execute desired attack logic. These attacks are identified if constraints C2
and/or C3 are violated.
2. Return to libc: This attack is a specific instance of ROP attack where con-
trol jumps to a function in libc after subverting the return address. This can
be identified if the execution constraint C3 is violated and the target of jump
belongs to dynamically mapped libc library.
3. Code injection on stack: While this attack can be prevented by using W   X
protection, it can still occur for systems that do not enforce this protection.
These attacks can easily be detected by identifying the stack boundaries using
the /proc/[pid]/maps file and checking if the instruction pointer %eip is fetch-
ing the instruction from this memory range. This corresponds to the execution
constraint C1.
Once our framework detects and identifies the attack, it generates a diagnosis
report. This report contains detailed information about the attack, namely: the
type of attack detected, the input arguments, the saved state of program at time
of crash (such as %esp, %eip), the vulnerable function. Tracing the target process
at instruction level granularity allows ROPShield to collect good quality diagnosis
information that is useful in deploying appropriate response mechanisms. Once the
response actions have been deployed, the corresponding information is also appended
to the diagnosis report. An example of diagnosis report generated by ROPShield is
shown in Figure 6.4.
6.3 Response
There are many possible ways in which the system may respond to ROP attacks.
One interesting approach is to let the illegal execution proceed and observe informa-
tion that the attacker is trying to gather or the actions that the attacker is trying



























Figure 6.4. Example of diagnosis report
eypots, this is clearly not a viable solution for production level and mission critical
systems. This is due to the fact that allowing these attacks to proceed may lead to
privilege escalation and the attacker will be able to subvert the defense and response
mechanism of the system.
Di↵erent response mechanisms may be desirable for di↵erent scenarios. For ex-
ample, for remote attacks against network applications such as a web server, an ap-
propriate response would be to block the remote IP address. However, if the attacker
is a local user on a system attempting privilege escalation, then blocking remote IP
address will not help and the system must respond by restricting access to the appli-
cation until it has been fixed, patch the vulnerability and redeploy the application.
Also, the type of response deployed depends on the type of attack and the applica-
tion being attacked. For example, an appropriate response for code injection attacks
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Response action: patch buffer
1. Identify source 
code for vulnerable 
function
2. Run static 





3. Generate patch 
to replace unsafe 
functions
4. Compile and 
relaunch process
Figure 6.5. Response action: Patch bu↵er overflow
would be to turn on W  X protection, but this response will not be e↵ective against
a code reuse attack. To allow for this flexibility, ROPShield uses a configuration file
that allows one to specify the response rules that determine the response actions to be
deployed when a certain type of attack is detected. These response rules also indicate
whether the response should be deployed manually or automatically.
6.3.1 Response Actions
When an attack is detected, a post-attack response must be deployed. As men-
tioned earlier, this can be either short term response or long term response. In this
section, we present two long term response actions - patch bu↵er overflow and deploy
code randomization in further detail. We do not discuss short term response actions
(such as kill target process) as their implementation is quite straightforward and does
not pose any interesting challenges.
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6.3.2 Response Action: Patch Bu↵er Overflow
This long term response action aims at patching the bu↵er overflow vulnerability
that is exploited by the ROP attack. Our approach targets unsafe library functions
such as strcpy that copies char data from a source bu↵er to a destination bu↵er
until it encounters a null character. strcpy does not do any bounds check while
copying this data. This allows a malicious entity to overflow the destination bu↵er
and overwrite return address to hijack the control flow of victim application.
This response action leverages the fine grained diagnosis information generated
during the diagnosis phase to identify and patch the bu↵er. Figure 6.5 indicates the
various steps involved in deploying this response action.
Running Example
In the discussion that follows, we use the following running example to illustrate
our approach.
36 void vuln (char* buff) {
37 char tmp[8] = { ‘\0’ };
38 strcpy(tmp, buff);
39 printf("-> %s\n", tmp);
40 }
In this example, vuln is a vulnerable function with bu↵er overflow vulnerability. It
declares a char bu↵er, tmp, that is statically allocated with 8 bytes (line 37). This
function calls the unsafe library function strcpy in line 38 that copies the contents of
bu↵er buff to bu↵er tmp. The strcpy function does not perform any bounds check
while copying the bu↵er. Thus, if buff is longer than 8 bytes and does not contain a
null terminating character, then the execution of the function will overwrite the data
on the stack. This can be used to craft malicious attack where the attacker supplies
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a carefully crafted buff to overwrite the return address on stack and redirect control
to the first gadget of the ROP exploit code.
Identifying the Vulnerability
The first step of this response action is to identify the exact vulnerability in the
source code of the application. When ROPShield detects an illegal control flow due
to ROP, it also identifies the function that contains the vulnerable bu↵er. At this
stage, only the address in the ELF binary and the corresponding symbol name are







This diagnosis information indicates that ROPShield detected a vulnerability in the
vuln function between addresses 0x08048ef6 and 0x08048f31. These addresses are
the function boundaries.
This information along with the debugging information in the ELF binary is used
to identify the corresponding line numbers in the source file. Specifically, the response
action invokes the addr2line tool to extract this information from the ELF binary.
addr2line tool translates the addresses into source file names and line numbers. For
the above example, this tool would produce the following output:
0x08048ef6: vuln at /home/alice/test/example.c:37
0x08048f31: vuln at /home/alice/test/example.c:42
This means that the vulnerable function vuln is contained between lines 37 and 42
in the source file example.c.
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Once this information is obtained, the response action analyzes these line numbers
by invoking a static analysis tool which identifies unsafe library functions and static
bu↵ers that are used in this line number range. The advantage of using analysis tools
on these line numbers rather than the entire source is that this will be more accurate
and e cient. The modular design of ROPShield allows integration of various static
analysis tools to perform this step. For our implementation, we chose to integrate
flawfinder tool [99] in this static analysis step.
Flawfinder analyzes the source code according to an existing set of rules to
find the potential vulnerability. Using this tool on the source files and line numbers
identified in the above step gives the following output:
test/ndh_rop.c:40: [4] (buffer) strcpy: Does not check for buffer
overflows when copying to destination. Consider using strncpy or
strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily misused).
test/ndh_rop.c:38: [2] (buffer) char: Statically-sized arrays can be
overflowed. Perform bounds checking, use functions that limit length,
or ensure that the size is larger than the maximum possible length.
This information indicates that the unsafe library function strcpy is used in line 38
and can lead to potential bu↵er overflow. Further, it also identifies the bu↵er tmp
in line 37 as a statically allocated bu↵er that can be overflown. Once these unsafe
functions have been identified, the response action proceeds to the next step, that is,
generating the source patch as discussed below.
Generating the Source Patch
The next step after the unsafe function is identified is to patch the source code
with the safe variant of this function. The safe variant of this function takes the length
of the destination bu↵er as input to perform bounds checking. Before replacing the
unsafe function with its safe variant, the response action must estimate the destination
bu↵er size. If the destination bu↵er is a statically allocated char bu↵er, then the
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bu↵er size is computed using the sizeof(.) function on the destination bu↵er.
However, if the destination bu↵er is a char pointer, then one needs to perform a
backward analysis to identify the statically allocated char bu↵er that it points to
before applying the sizeof operator. Following is an example of this scenario.
400 void func (char *src) {
401 char dest[25] = { ‘\0’ };
...
410 char *destptr = dest;
...
417 strcpy (destptr, src);
418 }
The response action now replaces the unsafe libc function with its safe variant. In
our example above, strcpy is replaced with strlcpy that performs bounds checking
while copying to the char bu↵er. The function call in line 38 of our working example
is now replaced with:
38 strlcpy(tmp, buff, sizeof(tmp));
After this patch is applied to the source code, the source code is recompiled and
the application is restarted. Since all the above steps are performed automatically
by ROPShield’s response component, the availability of the victim application is
significantly improved when compared to the traditional approach where a security
administrator has to manually examine log files and application code to identify the
vulnerability and fix it.
6.3.3 Response Action: Deploy Code Randomization
Another long term response action is to deploy preventive security mechanisms
that will strengthen a system against ROP attacks. One such mechanism is code
randomization which defends against ROP attacks even in the presence of bu↵er
overflow vulnerability.
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The underlying assumption behind any ROP attack is that the attacker is aware
of the entire layout of the process. That is, he/she knows the exact address of each
instruction in the executable code. This is used to identify useful gadgets and craft
the exploit payload. A code randomization-based ROP defense technique called Mar-
lin [96] can be used to break this assumption and thwart ROP attacks. Marlin
randomizes an application’s code by shu✏ing around the code blocks according to
a random permutation. This randomization is performed at run-time, that is, the
application executes with a di↵erent code layout with every execution. This denies
attacker any knowledge of the addresses where various instructions are loaded, thus
making it impossible to craft a valid ROP exploit.
Marlin uses a whitelist to specify which applications to randomize with every
execution. This whitelist serves as the integration point for using Marlin as a re-
sponse action within ROPShield. When ROPShield detects an ROP attack against
an application, the application is terminated, added to Marlin’s whitelist and then
restarted. This new execution of the vulnerable application uses a randomized layout,
thus thwarting future ROP attempts.
Integrating the Marlin randomization approach with ROPShield has multiple ad-
vantages. First, it enables a selective application of the Marlin technique on a demon-
strated need basis. Security mechanisms are often considered prohibitive which leads
to these mechanisms to not be used in the first place. However, applying such de-
fense mechanisms in response to detected attacks can improve the adoption of such
techniques. Second, ROPShield can be deployed on both randomized (according to
Marlin) and unrandomized binaries. While running ROPShield on a Marlin-processed
binary provides an extra degree of security, using only Marlin without ROPShield can
provide better e ciency. Depending on the application requirements, the administra-
tor can choose to turn o↵ ROPShield once the randomization based response using
Marlin has been deployed.
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6.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of ROPShield for 32-bit x86 architecture on
Ubuntu 12.04 operating system. We now discuss the implementation details of ROP-
Shield.
6.4.1 Detection and Diagnosis Component
The first step of the ROPShield detection component is the preprocessing step
that is responsible for identifying the function block boundaries in the executable
code. We use the objdump utility to disassemble the binary and parse symbol infor-
mation along with the start and end address of each symbol. Another information
retrieved during this stage is the identification of functions that execute without es-
tablishing their own stack frame. We noticed that some small functions in libc such
as libc read demonstrated this behavior. Since these functions do not establish
their own stack frame, they execute from the function context of the caller function.
Since ROPShield identifies this as illegal execution, this resulted in false positives.
To address this issue, we identify and mark such functions during preprocessing stage
to exempt these functions from the constraint evaluation. This identification is ex-
ecuted by searching for instruction sequence push %ebp; mov %ebp, %esp which is
the standard instruction sequence to establish a stack frame for a function. This pre-
processing step needs to be executed just once per application and can be performed
o✏ine. The information generated during this phase can be used for future runs of
the application.
To protect an application using ROPShield, we need the ability to continuously
monitor its execution. This is implemented by invoking the target application using a
wrapper that allows ROPShield to trace it, that is, the target application is forked as
a child process of ROPShield and tracing is executed by invoking the PTRACE TRACEME
request. For the tracing functionality, we decided to write our own tracer instead of
using the available trace utilities or debuggers such as ltrace, strace, gdb. The
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reason is that we need to control and monitor the execution at a much finer granu-
larity without incurring significant overhead. Our implementation of tracer uses the
ptrace system call that is the foundation of several tracing and debugging tools in-
cluding ltrace, strace and gdb. We introduce a breakpoint just before the main()
function call which is the point after which the process execution needs to be care-
fully monitored. Once the main() function is encountered, we single step through
the instructions using the PTRACE SINGLESTEP mode of the ptrace method.
At each instruction execution, we monitor the following variables: the stack
pointer (%esp), the instruction pointer (%eip), and the current instruction being
executed. The current instruction being executed is retrieved from /proc/[pid]/mem
file for the target process. We also maintain a stack of functions that corresponds
to the function frames on the real stack. This is used for verifying the execution
constraints C2 and C3.
In our initial implementation we used distorm3 [100], a disassembler library, to
disassemble and decode the instructions retrieved in each step. This can lead to
unnecessary overhead as we are only interested in knowing the instruction type of
an instruction to identify whether it is a control flow instruction (such as jump, call
or ret). To get this information from distorm3, we had to disassemble the complete
instruction. To eliminate this overhead, we wrote our own lightweight disassembler
that only looks at instruction opcodes to determine the type of instruction without
disassembling it completely.
While implementing the prototype for ROPShield, we had to handle some special
cases that are exceptions to typical control flow or use uncommon coding conven-
tions. Functions that execute without a stack frame is one example of this. Another
exception is a special return sequence, repz ret that is used instead of just ret for
performance reasons.
ROPShield uses various files such as configuration file and attack definition file to
configure its behavior. If an attacker can modify these files, he/she can easily bypass
ROPShield protection. Thus it is important that these files be stored securely. In
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our current implementation, these files are stored in the installation directory of
ROPShield and are write-protected so that they can be modified only by root user.
6.4.2 Response Component
ROPShield integrates various response actions that are specified in the response
definition file. The structure of response definition file (see section 6.1) makes it
trivial to add new response actions which can be implemented as separate modules
and then invoked from ROPShield.
The current implementation of ROPShield supports various response actions such
as process termination, process restart, patch bu↵er overflow, and code randomiza-
tion. Each response is implemented as a separate perl script that extracts the required
information from the diagnosis report to process its response logic. The command to
invoke this perl script along with its arguments is specified in the response definition
file. This response definition file is also write-protected and is writable only by the
root user. When ROPShield detects an attack, it reads the configuration file to iden-
tify the responses to be deployed, their mode of deployment (automatic or manual)
and the order according to which responses must be deployed. If a response action
in this response sequence is marked with manual deployment, ROPShield raises an
alarm for security administrator and continues deploying the remaining automatic
responses.
One of the response actions, patch bu↵er overflow, is a long term response that
aims at permanently fixing the vulnerability in the source code. Figure 6.5 provides
an overview of this response action. The first step, that is, the identification of the
source file requires debug headers to be present in the ELF executable. This requires
that the source code is compiled using the debug flag (-g). We use the addr2line
utility to get the source file and line number mapping for a given instruction address.
We provide the start and end address of the function symbol (as obtained during
preprocessing stage, see section 6.4.1) as input to addr2line to get the line numbers
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corresponding to the source of vulnerable function. Once we have this information,
we use flawfinder, a static analysis tool, on this source file and extract only those
hits that correspond to the lines in this function’s source. This helps in eliminating
several false positives that are detected by flawfinder. Next, we analyze the hit
list to identify the use of unsafe library functions and statically allocated bu↵ers.
These functions are then replaced with their safe variants that use the estimated
destination bu↵er size to prevent bu↵er overflow. All these steps are integrated into
one perl script that is invoked by ROPShield while deploying this response action.
The substitution of unsafe library functions with their safe variants is done ac-
cording to a set of replacement rules. The functions strcpy, strcat and sprintf
are replaced with strlcpy, strlcat and snprintf, respectively, that take an addi-
tional argument which is the destination bu↵er size. The vulnerable function gets
is replaced with fgets that takes two additional arguments – the destination bu↵er
size and input stream (in this case, stdin). Further, for functions such as strncpy
or snprintf that already take a size argument as input, the size argument may be
incorrectly specified by the developer. If such a function is detected, then the size
parameter is replaced with a ternary expression that takes the minimum of original
size argument and the estimated size of destination bu↵er. Also, for cases where the
substituted function is either strlcpy or strlcat, the patched program needs to be
compiled with libbsd since these functions are not a part of standard libc on Linux
systems.
Our design leverages existing analysis tools such as flawfinder to identify vulner-
able function. Thus, the accuracy of our diagnosis and response components depends
from the accuracy of the external tools that we integrate. However, the fine grained
diagnosis information generated by ROPShield reduces the scope of search, thus in-
creasing the accuracy of the tool. The flawfinder tool can be replaced by other
analysis tools as well that may provide more precise information. One advantage in
using flawfinder is that all vulnerable functions identified in our search scope will
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be fixed, rather than just fixing one vulnerable function that was responsible for the
overflow.
To fix the bu↵er overflow automatically, an obvious requirement is that the source
code be available on the system on which ROPShield is executing. However, in some
scenarios (for example, proprietary code) it may not be possible to make the source
code available on the deployed system. The response action for fixing bu↵er overflow,
as discussed above, only takes the diagnosis report as input. Thus, in such scenar-
ios, one can consider an architecture where the response component will send this
diagnosis report to an application maintenance server as feedback. The application
maintenance server, that contains the source code will fix the bu↵er overflow vulner-
ability in source, recompile the software and then push the updated application over
the network. That is, when the source code is unavailable, the patch can be generated
remotely and deployed to multiple systems at once.
6.4.3 Evaluation
We evaluated the e↵ectiveness of detection, diagnosis and response components
of ROPShield by testing it with various exploits (see section 6.4.3). The tests were
performed on a 32-bit x86 machine with Ubuntu 12.04 operating system.
Exploit dataset
To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our approach, we tested ROPShield against 9
code-reuse exploits that were collected from di↵erent sources. These exploits are
summarized in Table 6.1. The first two exploits, RG1 and RG2, are from the test
cases that were included with the ROPgadget attack tool v4 [98]. ROPgadget is a
ROP attack tool able to automatically find relevant gadgets and create the attack
payload. The first attack payload (referred to as ‘shellcode 1’ in Table 6.1) spawned




ID Exploit Source Vulnerability cause Exploit Payload
Type
RG1 ROPgadget v4 testcase Unsafe function strcpy ROP shellcode 1
RG2 ROPgadget v4 testcase Unsafe function strcpy ROP bind port
EDB1 Exploit-DB#17286(a) [101] Unsafe function strcpy Ret-to-libc shellcode 2
EDB2 Exploit-DB#17286(b) [101] Unsafe function strcpy Ret-to-libc shellcode 3
SRD1 NIST SRD Testcase #1563 Unsafe function gets ROP shell code 1
SRD2 NIST SRD Testcase #1600 Unsafe function strcpy ROP shellcode 1
SRD3 NIST SRD Testcase #1616 Incorrect size in snprintf ROP shellcode 1
SRD4 NIST SRD Testcase #1636 Unsafe function sprintf ROP shellcode 1
SRD5 NIST SRD Testcase #2081 Unsafe function strcat ROP shellcode 1
Both these attacks bypass ASLR protection as the gadgets were constructed from
application’s code and not library code.
The next two attacks, EDB1 and EDB2, are from Exploit Database (EDB) [102]
which is a repository for exploits and vulnerable software. For the EDB exploits, we
followed the instructions in the documentation to manually create our own vulnerable
application and exploit. These EDB exploits that we used are advanced return to
libc attacks that bypass ASCII armor protection. The two variants of this attack use
di↵erent shell code. The first one (referred to as ‘shellcode 2’ in Table 6.1) uses a
hardcoded address of “/bin/sh” string from shell environment. The second variant
(referred to as ‘shellcode 3’ in Table 6.1) is more robust as it uses calls to strcpy
to dynamically create the “/bin/sh” string by copying each ASCII character from a
di↵erent location.
The next five attacks, SRD1-SRD5, were constructed for vulnerable code samples
taken from the NIST SAMATE’s Reference dataset [103]. We selected five test cases
with weakness CWE-121, that is, Stack based bu↵er overflow. Not all code samples
with this vulnerability are usable for our evaluation since in some cases the bu↵er
overflow can only be used to crash a program and not to hijack the control flow.
Examples of such test cases include incorrect length checking such as o↵-by-one error.
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We only selected the test cases that could be exploited to launch a meaningful ROP
attack. Also, as can be seen in column 3 of Table 6.1, we selected test cases with
di↵erent vulnerable functions. For each of these test cases, we used the ROPgadget
v4 attack tool to craft the exploit payload (‘shellcode 1’) to spawn a shell.
We evaluated ROPShield on these exploits and the results are summarized in
Table 6.2
Exploit Detection
For each of these test cases, we executed the vulnerable program with ROPShield
tracing enabled and provided exploit payload as input. As shown in Table 6.1, our test
cases used 4 di↵erent type of exploit payloads amongst 9 test cases to test ROPShield
with di↵erent exploit payloads. ROPShield was successful in detecting and stopping
all of the nine attacks. All of these attacks violated the execution constraints by
returning to another function that was not in the call stack. We also tested ROPShield
with some non-malicious inputs and did not find any false positives.
Exploit Diagnosis
Once ROPShield detected these exploits, it also generated a diagnosis report for
each exploit. The diagnosis report generated by one of these test cases, SRD2 is
shown as an example in Figure 6.4. As shown in column 3 of Table 6.2, ROPShield
correctly diagnosed the type of attack that was stopped. In addition, it also correctly
identified other diagnosis information such as the vulnerable function. We also tested
these samples with random long strings as input that overflow the bu↵er and crash the
program but do not have any attack logic encoded in them. In these cases, ROPShield
halts the execution of target application and does not label this as an attack. Hence,
this information can be used to di↵erentiate between an attack payload and a random
crash due bu↵er overflow.
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Response Evaluation
The response component of ROPShield uses the diagnosis report generated in pre-
vious step as input to deploy appropriate response. We evaluated the correctness of
response component that is responsible for fixing bu↵er overflow. In all of the nine
test cases discussed above, ROPShield was able to correctly identify the source code
line responsible for overflow and correctly patch it. Most of these patches involved
replacing an unsafe library function with its safe variant that performs bounds check-
ing. A summary of these substitutions in presented in last column of Table 6.2. One
interesting case was SRD3 that was using snprintf with a size parameter, but the
size argument passed to this function call was incorrect. Following is a code snippet
from this test case where line 37 allows at most 1024 bytes to be copied to bu↵er buf
that has a maximum capacity of 40 bytes.
31 #define MAXSIZE 40




37 snprintf(buf,1024, "%s", str);
...
39 }
In the above test case, the response action replaced line 37 with the corrected
bu↵er size as shown below:
37 snprintf(buf,((sizeof(buf)<1024)?sizeof(buf):1024), "%s", str);
After the response action fixed the vulnerabilities in these 9 test cases, we restarted
these test cases and tested them again with the exploit code. All the patched pro-
grams truncated the exploit code to the size of bu↵er and prevented bu↵er overflow.
Thus, the response action was able to correctly identify and fix the bu↵er overflow




ID Detected by Diagnosis of Identification of Response deployed:
ROPShield Exploit Type Unsafe Function Fix bu↵er overflow
RG1 Yes ROP strcpy Replace strcpy with strlcpy
RG2 Yes ROP strcpy Replace strcpy with strlcpy
EDB1 Yes Ret-to-libc strcpy Replace strcpy with strlcpy
EDB2 Yes Ret-to-libc strcpy Replace strcpy with strlcpy
SRD1 Yes ROP gets Replace gets with fgets
SRD2 Yes ROP strcpy Replace strcpy with strlcpy
SRD3 Yes ROP snprintf Correct size parameter for snprintf
SRD4 Yes ROP sprintf Replace sprintf with snprintf
SRD5 Yes ROP strcat Replace strcat with strlcat
6.5 Conclusion
In this work we have proposed a comprehensive framework for detecting, diag-
nosing and responding against ROP attacks. The detection component uses a novel
technique for identifying ROP execution based on evaluating certain execution con-
straints. The diagnosis component is responsible for identifying the type of attack
and collecting diagnostic information to pass on to the response component. We have
implemented a prototype of ROPShield framework and present an evaluation of our
approach using this prototype implementation.
Our detection approach o↵ers several advantages over existing defense techniques.
First, the detection component operates directly on the executable and does not re-
quire the source code of the target application. The source code is only required when
the response action needs to generate a patch for source code. Second, unlike other
control flow analysis approaches, our technique does not require the complete control
flow graph (CFG) of the application as we check for certain execution constraints
instead of verifying the control flow integrity against the complete CFG. Third, our
technique does not require any code instrumentation or modification in the execution
semantics. Thus, the target process executes normally and our technique observes it
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without modifying its execution path. Fourth, our technique detects and stops ROP
attacks in real time. This is very important as it makes it possible to diagnose the
cause of the attack and respond to it in a suitable manner. Diversification based
techniques that randomize the target binary will crash the application when ROP
attack fails. These diversification based approaches do not provide enough diagnostic
information and the diagnosis cannot be done in real time.
While our approach promises several advantages, it also has certain limitations.
Correct identification of function blocks is an important requirement for our detection
technique. Thus, our detection technique may not work with obfuscated code and
stripped binaries where it is not possible to distinguish the function boundaries. Also,
our technique requires the code for target binary to be modular. If the vulnerable
bu↵er is present in a very large function, then the attacker might be able to build
an exploit payload using addresses within that function itself without the need to
switch function contexts during attack execution. Lastly, since the implementation of
ROPShield’s detection component uses tracing technique based on ptrace, the traced
application will incur a performance hit during runtime. However, this overhead can
be reduced by using alternate tracing techniques [104,105] that are more e cient.
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7 SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we have discussed various aspects of enforcing contextual access
control in a secure manner. First, we proposed a context profiling framework to
automatically infer contexts of interest for a user and intuitively configure access
control policies. Since presence of other users in proximity is an important contextual
factor for access control applications, we proposed a formal proximity model for RBAC
systems. We applied this proximity model to realms other than just geographical
proximity such as social proximity and cyber proximity.
For securing the policy enforcement system against code reuse attacks, we pro-
posed a fine grained randomization based technique that diversifies a binary with
every execution. Our proposed solution is applicable for various systems based on
x86 architecture, but can be extended to other architecture as well, for instance ARM
and AVR architectures. Embedded systems such as those based on Harvard archi-
tecture have been shown to be vulnerable to code reuse attacks [90]. Extending our
approach to secure these systems against code reuse attacks will involve architecture
specific implementation and tackling unique challenges posed by these systems such
as adapting our approach for constrained resources.
We also proposed ROPShield defense framework that uses run-time monitoring
to detect a ROP attack in real time and generates an attack diagnosis report to
identify the type and cause of the attack. It uses this diagnosis report to deploy
appropriate response such as patching the bu↵er overflow vulnerability. Runtime
attack diagnosis is a novel approach with several interesting research directions. For
instance, diagnostic information can be used to perform attack forensics, that is,
understand the purpose of an attack. This type of attack forensics allows deploying
appropriate responses to protect the sensitive data that is the target of the attack.
Attack diagnosis can also be used to apply preventive responses to applications that
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have not yet been attacked. For example, response actions can automatically be
applied to applications that are similar to the application that was attacked. This
would require understanding how to identify similar applications. Our current work
focuses on bu↵er overflow attacks but future research directions can include extending
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